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THE PRESIDENT’S IMMIGRATION COURTS 
Catherine Y. Kim* 
ABSTRACT 
Scholars have long documented the expansion of White House influence over 
agency decision-making; for at least the past quarter-century, presidential 
control has become the central feature of federal regulatory governance. Until 
recently, such influence was understood to target the performance of purely 
executive and legislative functions by agencies; commentators generally 
assumed that political operatives refrained from interfering in agencies’ 
performance of adjudicative functions. The Trump Administration has cast 
doubt on that assumption, deploying a series of reforms designed to reshape 
administrative adjudication in our nation’s immigration courts. This Article 
evaluates these emerging tools of political influence and their implications for 
the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of presidential administration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over eleven million noncitizens reside in the United States without 
authorization, either because they entered without inspection or because they 
overstayed their visas.1 Additionally, an estimated 1.9 million noncitizens—the 
majority of whom hold lawful immigrant status—are subject to deportation 
based on post-entry conduct.2 President Trump has placed the deportation of 
“illegals” at the center of his policy agenda, staking much of his political future 
on the ability to remove these individuals from the country.3 One of his 
administration’s core strategies has been aimed at “transforming [the] 
institutional culture and infrastructure” of our nation’s immigration courts.4  
These administrative courts, housed within the Department of Justice 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR),5 are staffed by “immigration 
judges”6 congressionally vested with authority to adjudicate whether a given 
noncitizen is “inadmissible” or “deportable,”7 and if so, whether the individual 
nonetheless is eligible for, and warrants, discretionary relief from removal.8 
 
 1 Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable for Half a Decade, PEW 
RES. CENTER (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/unauthorized-immigrant-
population-stable-for-half-a-decade/ (estimating 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the U.S. as of 
2014).  
 2 Muzaffar Chishti & Michelle Mittelstadt, Unauthorized Immigrants with Criminal Convictions: Who 
Might Be a Priority for Removal? MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Nov. 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/ 
unauthorized-immigrants-criminal-convictions-who-might-be-priority-removal (estimating 1.9 million 
noncitizens as removable criminal aliens, including approximately 820,000 unauthorized aliens).  
 3 See infra Section II.A.  
 4 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Backgrounder on EOIR Strategic Caseload Reduction Plan, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1016066/download.  
 5 6 U.S.C. § 521 (2012) (recognizing the Executive Office for Immigration Review). For descriptions of 
adjudication within immigration courts, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW: AN AGENCY GUIDE 2 (2017) [hereinafter EOIR: AN AGENCY GUIDE], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
page/file/eoir_an_agency_guide/download; AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND 
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 1–17 (2010) [hereinafter ABA, REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_ 
immigration/coi_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf; Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the 
Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1505 (2010); Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication 
and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 669 (2008) (examining creation of new legal rules through 
immigration adjudication).  
 6 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012) (defining “immigration judge”). 
 7 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012) (delegating to immigration judges the power to adjudicate 
inadmissibility or deportability in removal proceedings); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (setting forth grounds for 
inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (setting forth grounds for deportability). 
 8 The Immigration and Nationality Act provides an array of discretionary forms of relief from removal. 
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (setting forth statutory prerequisites for discretionary grants of 
asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (setting forth prerequisites for discretionary waivers of crime-based 
inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (setting forth prerequisites for discretionary cancellation of removal). 
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These agency officials in many cases also decide whether a detained alien may 
be released pending the outcome of removal proceedings.9 In fiscal year 2016, 
over 300,000 new proceedings were filed in immigration courts, to be 
adjudicated by one of approximately 330 immigration judges sitting in 58 courts 
across the nation.10 For millions of individuals facing deportation, immigration 
courts are the final arbiter to determine whether they will be removed from, or 
permitted to remain in, the United States.11 
Immigration courts have long been the subject of criticism from both the 
right and the left.12 Commentators have documented vast disparities in case 
 
See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMM. L.J. 611, 612, 624, 640 (2006) 
(discussing various forms of discretionary authority within immigration system).  
 9 Congress has provided that certain noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention pending removal 
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (noncitizens subject to crime-based removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) 
(2012) (arriving or recently-arrived noncitizens without documentation or with fraudulent documents); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226a(a)(1) (2012) (suspected terrorists). For noncitizens exempt from these provisions, detention decisions 
are made in the first instance by the enforcement officers and prosecutors within the Department of Homeland 
Security. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(b)(1)–(2), 287.5(a)–(c) (2018). Once charges have been filed in immigration court, 
a detained alien may request a bond rehearing before the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 
1003.19(a)–(f) (2018). For an empirical analysis of bond determinations made in immigration courts, see Emily 
Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Review, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117, 144 (2016) [hereinafter Detained 
Study]. 
 10 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK A2–A3 (2017) 
[hereinafter EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/download; Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-
judge (last visited Aug. 20, 2018). 
 11 Not all aliens subject to removal are entitled to a formal removal proceeding before an immigration 
judge. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that certain arriving aliens and recent entrants without 
documentation or with fraudulent documents, and certain noncitizens posing national security risks, may be 
subject to “expedited removal,” in which a summary and final order of removal is entered not by an immigration 
judge but rather by an enforcement officer within the Department of Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1) (2012); see Ebba Gebisa, Constitutional Concerns with the Enforcement and 
Expansion of Expedited Removal, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 567, 576 (2007). Formal removal proceedings 
may also be denied to noncitizens without legal permanent resident status who have been convicted of an 
“aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2012) (providing that the Attorney General may develop truncated 
removal procedures for such noncitizens); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining “aggravated 
felony”); NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWS. GUILD, PRACTICE ADVISORY: ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMOVAL UNDER 238(b) 1 (Feb. 16, 2017), https://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/practice-
advisory-administrative-removal-under-238b.pdf (describing administrative removal procedures for such 
noncitizens). 
 12 The federal courts of appeals have been particularly critical. See, e.g., Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 
142, 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The hearings included several instances of questioning by the [immigration judge] 
that were at least inappropriate and at worst indicative of bias against Chinese witnesses.”); Cham v. Att’y Gen. 
of the U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The case now before us exemplifies the ‘severe wound . . . 
inflicted’ when not a modicum of courtesy, of respect, or of any pretense of fairness is extended to a petitioner 
and the case he so valiantly attempted to present. Yet once again, under the ‘bullying’ nature of the immigration 
judge’s questioning, a petitioner was ground to bits.”); Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 
2005) (Posner, J.) (concluding that immigration court adjudication “has fallen below the minimum standards of 
legal justice”); Wang v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The tone, the tenor, the 
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outcomes,13 staggering processing times and backlogs,14 and an overall lack of 
fair and meaningful deliberation.15 Unlike prior reform proposals,16 however, 
the Trump Administration has sought to expand its political control over these 
courts.17 Over the past year and a half, under the tenure of Attorney General Jeff 
 
disparagement, and the sarcasm of the [immigration judge] seem more appropriate to a court television show 
than a federal court proceeding.”); Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The 
[immigration judge] opinion in this case is extreme in its lack of a coherent explanation.”). See generally Jonah 
B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication, 97 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 15, 24), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1951/ 
(documenting circuit court criticism of immigration courts); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration 
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1645–46, 1648–49 (2010) (documenting widespread criticism of immigration 
courts). 
 13 Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 16, 30, 47, 53–54 (2015) (noting disparities based on whether noncitizen was represented by 
counsel); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372 (2007) (documenting disparities in rates of granting asylum 
applications); Ryo, Detained Study, supra note 9 (documenting disparities in rates of granting bond and amounts 
of bond). 
 14 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 25 
(2017) [hereinafter GAO 2017 REPORT]; Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Report for the Administrative 
Conference of the United States: Enhancing Quality and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication 24–
25, 27–29 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/report/immigration-removal-adjudication-report; BOOZ ALLEN 
HAMILTON, LEGAL CASE STUDY: SUMMARY REPORT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW 3, 19, 21, 25 (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/ 
foia_documents/immigration_judge_performance_metrics_foia_request_booz_allen_hamilton_case_study.pdf.  
 15 See, e.g., Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 595, 611, 624, 627, 632 (2009) (criticizing practices diverting noncitizens from formal removal 
proceedings); Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis 
in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 504 (2013) (criticizing practice of obtaining waivers of right 
to removal proceedings); John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration 
Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 29–32, 76 (2005) (criticizing reforms to streamline decision-making of immigration courts 
at the administrative appeals level). 
 16 For proposals to reform immigration adjudication, see Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration 
Adjudication, supra note 12, at 1686 (proposing creation of new Article III immigration appellate court); Ramji-
Nogales et al., supra note 13, at 380–87 (recommending various reforms to immigration courts and Board of 
Immigration Appeals); ABA, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 6-4 (proposing systemic 
restructuring of immigration adjudication); BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 18–26 (setting forth 
various recommendations including expanded hiring and training of immigration judges).  
 17 Attempts to politicize immigration court proceedings are not unprecedented. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY AND OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AN INVESTIGATION OF 
ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 137 (2008) [hereinafter DOJ INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT], https://oig.justice.gov/special/ 
s0807/final.pdf (finding that hiring within EOIR was made on the basis of political affiliation in violation of law 
and Department policy); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 369, 372–74 (2006) [hereinafter Legomsky, War on Independence] (describing evisceration of decisional 
independence of immigration judges); Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 129, 143–44 (2016–2017); cf. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive 
KIM_GALLEYPROOFS 9/26/2018 9:59 AM 
6 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1 
Sessions, the Trump Administration has eliminated immigration judges’ 
authority to grant relief from removal in the form of administrative closure; 
altered longstanding agency precedent regarding the availability of asylum; 
sought to mandate the detention of virtually all noncitizens pending removal 
proceedings; engaged in an aggressive hiring plan to recruit new judges; and 
implemented supervisory mechanisms including performance metrics to 
expedite case processing and increase rates of removal.18 These reforms cast 
doubt on the conventional narrative within administrative law scholarship 
maintaining that while the White House has expanded control over various 
aspects of the regulatory state, it refrains from interfering in administrative 
adjudications.19 
Whatever one’s substantive policy preferences—whether one believes that 
we should be deporting more or fewer noncitizens from our country—these 
developments raise fundamental concerns regarding the legitimacy of 
presidential control over administrative adjudications more generally.20 The 
increased politicization of agency adjudications raises a host of thorny questions 
about the extent to which such proceedings should be insulated from political 
 
Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 896–97 
(2016) (endorsing such political control).  
 18 See infra Section II.C. 
 19 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2306 (2001) (observing 
expansion of presidential control over agency decision-making but maintaining that such control does not reach 
administrative adjudications); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
1163, 1211 (2013) [hereinafter Vermeule, Agency Independence] (asserting existence of a “network of tacit 
unwritten conventions” functioning to “protect the independence of” federal agencies engaged in adjudication). 
But see Harold J. Krent, Presidential Control of Adjudication Within the Executive Branch, 65 CASE WEST. L. 
REV. 1083, 1091–1105 (2015) (describing mechanisms through which the President may influence agency 
adjudications).  
 20 Evidence of a growing politicization of agency adjudications is not limited to the immigration context. 
The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) recently published a report surveying adjudicators’ 
susceptibility to political influence across the administrative state. See KENT BARNETT ET AL., NON-ALJ 
ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL (2018) [hereinafter 
NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS] (surveying lack of protections from political influence in agency adjudicators across 
the administrative state), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Non-ALJ%20Draft%20Report_2. 
pdf. Scholars have also documented bias and political interference in adjudications within particular agencies. 
See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 818 (2013) (noting administrative efforts 
to interfere in Social Security Administration adjudications); Christina L. Boyd & Amanda Driscoll, 
Adjudicatory Oversight and Judicial Decision Making in Executive Branch Agencies, 41 AM. POLS. RES. 569, 
570–71 (2013) (assessing political control over adjudications within the Department of Agriculture); Krent, 
supra note 19, at 1110–14 (examining political oversight in SSA adjudications); Robert R. Kuehn, Addressing 
Bias in Administrative Environmental Decisions, 37 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 693, 699–700, 774, 
781–82 (2017) (examining claims of political bias in EPA adjudications); Amy Elizabeth Semet, An Empirical 
Examination of Adjudications at the National Labor Relations Board 184 (2015) (unpublished dissertation) (on 
file with Columbia University) (describing political interference in NLRB adjudications), https:// 
academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:189982. 
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influence. Commentators often assert that presidential control over agency 
adjudications would be normatively, if not constitutionally, problematic.21 This 
Article asserts that the normative calculus is somewhat more complicated, 
implicating a constellation of often-competing goals including individual 
fairness, democratic accountability, accuracy, efficiency, and fidelity to 
separation-of-powers principles.22 It proceeds as follows. Part I briefly recounts 
the rise of presidential control over agency decision-making and the 
conventional assumption that such control does not extend to agency 
adjudications. Part II documents evidence to rebut that assumption, identifying 
a series of recent reforms designed to shift outcomes in immigration 
adjudication. Part III identifies the legal norms at stake in the politicization of 
agency adjudications and evaluates the recent reforms to removal proceedings 
on the basis of these metrics.  
I. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL 
Federal agencies occupy a special place in our constitutional system.23 
Formally, they are constituent parts of the Executive Branch serving under the 
 
 21 See Barnett, supra note 20, at 816 (noting that limited independence of ALJs “raises impartiality, and 
thus due process, concerns”); Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better 
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 1300 (1962) [hereinafter Friendly, The Federal Administrative 
Agencies] (“Everyone, including the presidential activists, seems to agree that ‘the outcome of any particular 
adjudicatory matter is . . . as much beyond . . . [the President’s] concern . . . as the outcome of any cause pending 
in the courts . . . .’”) (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 
33 (1960) (alterations in original)); Kagan, supra note 19, at 2363 (noting that presidential control over agency 
adjudications “would contravene procedural norms and inject an inappropriate influence into the resolution of 
controversies”); Krent, supra note 19, at 1084 (acknowledging President’s inherent authority to manage agency 
adjudications but asserting that “political control over adjudication seems anathema to rights of litigants asserting 
claims against the government itself”); see also Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1741, 1744 (2009) (noting that presidential control over agency actions may compromise democratic 
accountability); Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
71–72 (2017) [hereinafter Metzger, The Administrative State Under Siege] (arguing that checks on presidential 
control over agencies are constitutionally required). But see Gonzales & Glen, supra note 17, at 896–97 
(extolling political control over immigration adjudication); James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s 
Independence Myth, 41 WAKE F. L. REV. 1191, 1200, 1234 (2006) (maintaining that administrative judges 
should be impartial, but not politically independent). 
 22 See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà vu of Decisional 
Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 481 (2007) (“There is an obvious tension between 
the oversight that promotes consistency and accuracy and the decisional independence of agency adjudicators. 
This tension has bedeviled administrative law from its inception.”); Legomsky, War on Independence, supra 
note 17, at 390 (noting tension between decisional independence and political accountability); Adrian Vermeule, 
Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2487 
(2017) (endorsing “marginalist” approach to optimize a plurality of competing values). 
 23 See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579 (1984). 
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President.24 But Congress is responsible for creating agencies and delegating 
their authority,25 and the federal courts play a crucial role in policing 
administrative exercises of that authority.26  
Through time, theorists have developed a series of models to describe how 
agencies are controlled. Prior models conceptualized agencies as primarily 
agents of Congress, while others emphasized the extent to which they are subject 
to control by federal courts or even non-governmental interest groups.27 Under 
the currently prevailing model, the “presidential control model,” the White 
House and its political appointees are understood to be the primary drivers of 
agency action.28 This Part proceeds in three sections: Section A offers a brief 
description of the presidential control model of agency action. Section B 
explains the conventional assumption that such control stops short of agency 
adjudications. Finally, section C points out weaknesses in assuming adjudicative 
independence from political influence.  
 
 24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (“The vesting of the 
[E]xecutive power in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President 
alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates . . . . As 
he is charged specifically to take care that [the laws] be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in 
the absence of express words, was that as part of his [E]xecutive power he should select those who were to act 
for him under his direction . . . .”). 
 25 See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no 
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”).  
 26 LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965) (“The availability of 
judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power 
which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”).  
 27 Under the “transmission belt” model, agencies were understood to be controlled primarily by Congress, 
which issued discrete statutory directives with little policymaking discretion. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470 (2003). 
By contrast, under the “interest group representation” model, agencies were viewed as controlled by a political 
process in which competing interest groups negotiate and compromise on policy outcomes. See id. at 475, 469–
77 (describing other historical models of agency control). 
 28 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical 
Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 52–53 (2006) (examining presidential control 
from perspective of agency officials); Kagan, supra note 19, at 2331 (endorsing presidential control over agency 
policymaking); Metzger, The Administrative State Under Siege, supra note 21, at 14–15 (describing emergence 
of presidential administrative control); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Presidential Control is Better than the Alternatives, 
88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 113, 114, 116 (2009–2011) (recognizing dominance of presidential control model); 
Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “the Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
696, 702–03 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, The President in Administrative Law] (arguing that President has power 
to oversee, but not direct, agency action); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 683, 688 (2016) (noting that presidential control has become “an entrenched feature of the regulatory state” 
and proposing doctrinal rules to “control . . . but not unnecessarily constrain” such influence).  
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A. Emergence of Presidential Control 
For the past quarter-century, administrative law scholars have observed the 
steady expansion of White House influence over agency action; indeed, 
presidential control has become the defining feature of our modern regulatory 
landscape.29 Two mechanisms have been crucial in allowing the White House 
and its political leadership to ensure that agency decisions adhere to and promote 
the President’s political agenda: (1) the emergence of centralized White House 
regulatory planning and review; and (2) the expansion of presidential 
appointments in agencies.  
Centralized regulatory planning and review. For decades, the Oval Office 
has ensured that regulatory decisions are vetted through the White House. 
Building on earlier administrations’ efforts to enhance interagency coordination, 
President Ronald Reagan required all Executive Branch agencies to submit 
“major” rulemaking proposals for pre-approval to the White House Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).30 President Bill Clinton expanded 
that centralization, requiring both Executive Branch agencies and independent 
ones to submit a list of “significant regulatory actions” planned for the 
forthcoming year.31 President George W. Bush extended these requirements to 
cover not only proposed rules and regulations but also guidance documents 
exempt from notice-and-comment requirements,32 a mandate which President 
Obama retained.33 
Expansion of presidential appointees. The number and percentage of 
presidentially appointed agency positions has nearly doubled over the past fifty 
years, and the vast majority of these positions serve at the pleasure of the 
President with no protections from removal.34 Moreover, Congress has 
eliminated civil service protections for large segments of the bureaucracy, 
rendering a growing number of agency officials vulnerable to removal on 
 
 29 Supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 30 Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981–1982). While OIRA does not claim the power to 
reject regulatory proposals outright, it routinely returns proposals to agencies for reconsideration and can delay 
release indefinitely. See Kagan, supra note 19, at 2278. 
 31 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(c)(B), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993–1994). 
 32 Exec. Order No. 13,422, §§ 3(g)–(h), 4(b)–(c), 3 C.F.R. § 191 (2007–2008).  
 33 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & 
Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009).  
 34 DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND 
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 21–22 (2008); see also DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 70, 82–83 (2013), https:// 
www.acus.gov/publication/sourcebook-united-states-executive-agencies. 
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ideological grounds rather than for cause.35 As then-Professor David Barron 
observed, “agencies are now staffed in ways that make them increasingly likely 
to speak the White House line as if it were their own, even if they have not been 
ordered to do so by the President.”36 Taken together, these mechanisms enable 
significant political oversight over agency decision-making.  
Agency decision-making, however, takes many forms, including not only 
purely “Executive” functions but also quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative 
ones.37 Purely “Executive” decisions include ministerial exercises of specified 
statutory directives as well as decisions to enforce individual violations of 
generally applicable standards.38 “Legislative” or quasi-legislative decisions 
involve the promulgation of those generally applicable standards of conduct; in 
the agency context, they are most closely associated with exercises of 
rulemaking authority.39 “Adjudicative” or quasi-adjudicative decisions involve 
the resolution of disputes between discrete parties, typically in an adversarial, 
trial-like setting.40   
Presidents have long exercised control over administrative exercises of 
purely Executive functions.41 As Professor Peter Strauss recounts, President 
Jackson, who staunchly opposed the creation of the Bank of the United States, 
directed two successive Treasury Secretaries to remove all funds from the Bank 
and terminated them for refusing to heed his command.42 President Nixon 
purportedly fired Leon Panetta (who would later serve as the Director of the CIA 
and Secretary of Defense) from his leadership post at the Office for Civil Rights 
 
 35 LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 34, at 72–81 (describing expansion of federal employees exempted from 
civil service protections).  
 36 David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency 
Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1121 (2008). 
 37 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1248 (1994) 
(characterizing concentration of these functions as “perhaps the crowning jewel of the modern administrative 
revolution”); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1394 (2004) 
(noting breadth of policymaking tools available to agencies); see also PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW UNLAWFUL? 2–4, 493–94 (2014) (criticizing agency assumption of power to engage in quasi-legislative 
and quasi-adjudicative acts).  
 38 See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2013) 
(“Enforcement is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to ‘take Care’ that laws are faithfully 
executed.” (footnote omitted)); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 596 (1994) (characterizing decision to fine a bank for violation of banking 
laws as exercise of purely Executive power); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 671, 696–97 (2014) (characterizing enforcement discretion as part of President’s duty to 
“faithfully” execute the laws).  
 39 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)–(5), 553 (2012). 
 40 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)–(7), 554, 556, 557 (2012). 
 41 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 42 See Strauss, The President in Administrative Law, supra note 28, at 706. 
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in the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare because the 
latter refused to comply with presidential policies designed to court southern 
white voters.43 President Obama directed his administration to enforce sex 
discrimination laws to protect LGBTQ individuals.44 More controversially, he 
ordered the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to refrain from enforcing 
immigration laws against undocumented noncitizens who were brought to the 
United States as children.45   
Past Presidents have exercised meaningful control over agencies engaged in 
quasi-legislative functions as well. The Carter White House exercised power in 
a range of rulemaking contexts, including occupational safety, air pollution, and 
strip mining.46 President Clinton directed the promulgation of regulations 
relating to youth smoking and parental leave policies.47 Such presidential control 
over rulemaking is not always apparent,48 but it undoubtedly exists. According 
to one empirical study, the Clinton White House allowed fewer than 40% of 
proposed regulations to proceed without change; during the Bush 
Administration, only 17% of such proposals proceeded unaltered.49 These 
examples demonstrate the extent to which Presidents have asserted control over 
agency decisions relating to Executive functions as well as Legislative ones.  
B. Presumed Restraint Toward Adjudicative Functions 
It has generally been understood, however, that presidential control stops 
short of one form of agency decision-making: that of administrative 
 
 43 LEON E. PANETTA & PETER GALL, BRING US TOGETHER: THE NIXON TEAM AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
RETREAT 1, 350 (1971); see also Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools, 43 FLA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 91, 111 (2015) (documenting political control over enforcement of anti-discrimination 
protections). 
 44 President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Executive Order on LGBT 
Workplace Discrimination (July 21, 2014). 
 45 President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012); Robert J. 
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the 
DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 792, 794 (2013) (challenging constitutionality of 
the Obama Administration’s immigration enforcement policy).  
 46 Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944–46 (1980). 
 47 Kagan, supra note 19, at 2282–84; see also Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI. KENT 
L. REV. 965, 965 (1997). 
 48 See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 28; Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight 
of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1146–47 (2010). For a discussion of the Bush 
Administration’s covert efforts to control EPA rulemaking, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and 
Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 799–801 (2007); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts 
v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 55 (2007); Kitrosser, supra note 21, at 1767. 
 49 Mendelson, supra note 48, at 1150. 
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adjudication. In 1962, Judge Henry Friendly observed, “[e]veryone, including 
the presidential activists, seems to agree that ‘the outcome of any particular 
adjudicatory matter is . . . as much beyond . . . [the President’s] concern . . . as 
the outcome of any cause pending in the courts . . . .”50 Then-Professor Elena 
Kagan’s account of President Clinton’s expansive control over agencies 
similarly notes, “[t]he only mode of administrative action from which Clinton 
shrank was adjudication. At no time in his tenure did he attempt publicly to 
exercise the powers that a department head possesses over an agency’s on-the-
record determinations.”51 Professor Adrian Vermeule likewise asserts the 
existence of a “network of tacit unwritten conventions” protecting agency 
adjudications from presidential interference.52  
The contention that agency adjudications remain impervious to political 
interference rests on two more specific assumptions. First, that the White House 
is legally constrained in the extent to which it can control agency adjudications. 
And second, that public sensibilities, or “conventions,” would not tolerate 
exercises of raw political power in the adjudicative context.  
1. Legal Constraints 
The claim that the President, whether through the White House or his 
political appointees, refrains from interfering in administrative adjudications 
rests in part on the assumption that agency adjudicators are protected from such 
influence by legal barriers.53 Congress has legislated a series of measures to 
protect the independence of agency adjudicators. Most formal adjudications 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which governs all agency 
actions unless a more specific statute controls, are decided in the first instance 
by Administrative Law Judges (ALJs),54 who are not recruited by the agency’s 
political leadership and cannot be fired except for good cause.55  
 
 50 Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies, supra note 21. 
 51 See Kagan, supra note 19.  
 52 See Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 19. 
 53 For a discussion of the constitutional and statutory contours of the President’s power to control agency 
adjudications, see Krent, supra note 19 (arguing that Congress should be able to delimit presidential authority 
over agency adjudicators); see also Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246, 255 (1987) (analyzing role of 
agency institutional design in defining extent to which agency decisions are influenced by political actors). 
 54 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 5372(a) (2012); see also MICHAEL ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 2 (2016) (noting that “[w]ith few exceptions,” formal adjudicative 
hearings under the APA are presided over by an ALJ). 
 55 For a discussion of the parameters for hiring and firing ALJs, see Barnett, supra note 20, at 799, 806–
07; James G. Gilbert & Robert S. Cohen, Administrative Adjudication in the United States, 37 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY, 222, 225–26 (2017). The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence signals renewed attention 
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The APA further protects the process of administrative adjudication from 
political influence. Section 556(e) explicitly limits the information on which the 
agency adjudicator may rely in reaching a decision: “The transcript of testimony 
and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, 
constitutes the exclusive record for decision . . . .”56 It further requires disclosure 
of any material outside of the record that is considered in reaching the decision.57  
Even agency adjudications that are not subject to the APA typically enjoy a 
degree of statutory protection from political interference.58 Removal 
proceedings in immigration courts, for example, are not governed by the APA,59 
but rather by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).60 Like the APA, 
however, the INA provides private parties with a relatively formal evidentiary 
proceeding and a complete record of all the testimony and evidence produced at 
that proceeding.61 It also mandates that a decision to deport “shall be based only 
on the evidence produced at the hearing,”62 providing assurance that removal 
decisions be based on the agency adjudicator’s independent assessment of the 
record rather than at the direction of political leadership.63  
2. Cultural Constraints 
Professor Adrian Vermeule posits an alternative reason for the assumption 
that “presidential direction of the adjudicative activities of executive agencies” 
has been limited.64 The reason for this phenomenon, he claims, is the power of 
 
to the constitutional status of ALJs. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
542–43 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting majority opinion casts doubt on constitutionality of for-cause 
removal protections for ALJs); Lucia v. SEC, No. 17–130, slip op. at 5, 10 (U.S. June 21, 2018) (holding that 
ALJs within the independent SEC are “Officers of the United States” and must be appointed consistent with 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).  
 56 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012). 
 57 Id. (“When an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence 
in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.”). 
 58 The vast majority of formal agency adjudications, i.e., those requiring an evidentiary hearing, occur 
outside the parameters of the APA. Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency 
Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2, 7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=3129560; see also ASIMOW, supra note 56 (noting diversity of formal agency adjudications 
exempted from APA requirements).  
 59 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (noting legislative enactment clarifying congressional 
intent to exempt removal proceedings from APA requirements). 
 60 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012). 
 61 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A), (b)(4)(A)–(C). 
 62 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(1)(A). 
 63 Implementing regulations further provide, “[i]n deciding individual cases before them, and subject to 
the applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and 
discretion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(d)(ii) (2018). 
 64 Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 19. 
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“conventions.”65 He asserts, “[t]he real source of the limitation is a network of 
tacit unwritten conventions that protect independence of even executive 
agencies when engaged in adjudication.”66 He explains: “[a]mong the 
communities that shape administrative law—including civil servants, the 
organized bar, legislative committees, and regulated parties—presidential 
direction of administrative adjudication would be seen as an unprecedented 
exertion of power, violating longstanding unwritten traditions, and would for 
that reason provoke a storm of protest.”67 
From this perspective, the White House and its political appointees refrain 
from interfering in agency adjudications not because of formal legal constraints, 
but rather because of informal cultural ones. We live in a political culture which 
disdains the exercise of overt political influence in individual cases.  
3. Historical Attempts to Politicize Agency Adjudications 
Historical attempts to politicize agency adjudications suggest that legal and 
cultural constraints, at least in the past, have succeeded in protecting these types 
of administrative proceedings from significant political influence. In 1980, in 
response to political concerns that agency adjudicators within the Social 
Security Administration were too generous in awarding disabilities benefits, 
Congress enacted a new provision requiring review over decisions of ALJs who 
granted more than 70% of claims.68 The Association of Administrative Law 
Judges filed suit, and a district court concluded that the provision violated the 
spirit, if not the letter, of the APA.69  
A second example involved immigration court adjudications during the 
Bush Administration. From 2004 to 2007, the White House directed the hiring 
of new immigration judges (IJs) and members of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA), screening candidates for partisan affiliation.70 In 2008, however, 
the Department of Justice Offices of the Inspector General and of Professional 
 
 65 Id. at 1181, 1194. 
 66 Id. at 1211. 
 67 Id. at 1213. 
 68 Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1134–35 (D.D.C. 1984); JERRY L. 
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 171, 174–76 (1983); 
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System of Performance 
Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589, 595–97 (1993–1994).  
 69 594 F. Supp. at 1136–37, 1142–43. 
 70 DOJ INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 17, at 1, 135. 
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Responsibility issued a joint report finding that these hiring practices violated 
Department policy as well as federal law.71  
The public outcry over these incidents,72 as well as the findings of illegality, 
suggest that both legal barriers and conventions about adjudicative 
independence imposed meaningful constraints on political interference in 
agency adjudications.  
C. Reevaluating the Presumption of Adjudicative Independence from 
Presidential Control 
Yet, the political insulation of agency adjudications cannot be taken for 
granted. After all, the White House retains powerful reasons for wanting to 
control them. Federal agencies adjudicate everything from disability claims to 
unfair labor practices, from the granting of broadcast licenses to approval for 
corporate mergers.73 As such, these decisions have a substantial impact on the 
President’s ability to achieve his policy goals.74 In Securities Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), the Supreme Court endorsed the use 
of agency adjudication as a means for announcing broadly applicable policy 
changes. In that case, the Commission announced a new standard of conduct—
precluding fiduciaries from trading in a company’s shares pending 
reorganization—in the course of an individual adjudication.75 Rejecting the 
managers’ and officers’ claim that the new standard could only be established 
through rulemaking procedures, the Court held, “the choice made between 
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies 
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”76 
Consequently, agency adjudications—no less than enforcement decisions or 
rulemaking—can play a powerful role in promoting or frustrating the President’s 
policy agenda. As Professor William Araiza notes, “courts normally purport 
 
 71 Id. 
 72 See generally Eric Lichtblau, Report Faults Aides in Hiring at Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/washington/29justice.html. 
 73 See Gilbert & Cohen, supra note 55, at 254 (surveying breadth of agency adjudications). See generally 
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. AND STANFORD LAW SCH., REPRESENTATION OF PRIVATE PARTIES, https://acus.law. 
stanford.edu/content/federal-administrative-adjudication (mapping contours of federal agency adjudication). 
 74 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 718 (2005) 
(exploring development of policy through agency adjudications). 
 75 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 197–99 (1947). 
 76 Id. at 203 (italics removed); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (affirming 
that the agency “is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding, and that the 
choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within” the agency’s discretion); see also 
Magill, supra note 37 (addressing absence of direct judicial constraints on agency choice to implement new 
policies through one particular policymaking tool rather than another). 
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only to apply existing law, while federal agencies are explicitly understood to 
have the power to make law in the course of deciding cases.”77 These factors 
provide the White House with strong incentives to influence the course of 
agency adjudications.78  
Even agency adjudications that do not announce binding national policy, 
such as those made at the trial level in disabilities adjudications or removal 
proceedings, impact the lives of millions of Americans and thus, potentially, a 
President’s political fortunes. For example, it is often observed that the annual 
number of adjudications within the Social Security Administration far exceeds 
that of all federal courts put together.79 There are over half a million deportation 
cases currently pending in immigration courts,80 decisions that will inevitably 
impact not only the noncitizen at issue, but also his or her family members, 
employers, and others. At the same time, the legal and cultural barriers to 
presidential control over agency adjudications are far from impenetrable.  
1. Limits of Legal Barriers to Political Control 
While Congress has imposed legal restrictions on the extent to which politics 
may influence agency adjudications, those restrictions are incomplete. Although 
most formal adjudications under the APA are heard in the first instance by an 
impartial adjudicator separated from prosecutorial or investigate functions,81 the 
statute expressly allows that the initial hearing may be conducted instead by the 
politically appointed leadership of an agency.82 And, even when a politically 
insulated civil servant presides over the hearing in the first instance, the APA 
grants agency leadership virtually unfettered discretion to reverse that initial 
decision.83  
 
 77 William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the Limitations of Labels, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 353 (2000). 
 78 Professor Peter Strauss suggests that career officials within the administrative bureaucracy employ 
adjudication to promulgate policies in part to avoid obstacles posed by their politically appointed superiors. Peter 
L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the 
Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1253 (1974).  
 79 See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND 
COMMENTS 26 (12th ed. 2018). 
 80 Overview of the Executive Office for Immigration Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration & Border Sec. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (statement of James McHenry, Acting 
Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review) [hereinafter McHenry Testimony], https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Witness-Testimony-James-McHenry-EIOR-11-01-2017.pdf.  
 81 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 556(b), 557(b) (2012). 
 82 5 U.S.C. § 556(b). The Supreme Court has sustained such decision-making against due process 
challenges. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702–03 (1948).  
 83 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers 
which it would have in making the initial decision . . . .”).  
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Moreover, the majority of formal agency adjudications (i.e., those involving 
an evidentiary hearing) are not governed by the APA.84 For immigration removal 
proceedings, the INA vests adjudicative power in immigration judges (IJs) 
personally, precluding the agency’s politically appointed leadership from 
presiding over these hearings.85 Nonetheless, it defines an IJ as an attorney 
appointed by the Attorney General who remains “subject to such supervision 
and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe.”86 
Moreover, although the Department of Justice Inspector General has concluded 
that civil service laws protect IJs from politically- or ideologically-motivated 
employment decisions,87 the Attorney General in 2002 issued regulations 
asserting that such officials are subject to removal or reassignment effectively at 
the Attorney General’s discretion.88  
Indeed, although the INA, unlike the APA, provides that federal courts 
possess exclusive authority to review the decisions of IJs,89 the Attorney General 
has, through regulation, created an interim review body—the Board of 
Immigration Appeals90—and a “refer-and-review” procedure by which the 
Attorney General can unilaterally reverse any decision of the BIA.91 The 
Attorney General has exercised this refer-and-review power repeatedly to 
reverse BIA decisions perceived to depart from the President’s political 
agenda.92 Indeed, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales recently co-
authored a law review article championing the exercise of this authority, 
characterizing it “as a powerful tool through which the Executive Branch can 
assert its prerogatives in the immigration field.”93  
 
 84 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 85 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012) (“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for 
deciding the admissibility or deportability of an alien.”), with 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012) (providing that the 
agency itself may preside over the taking of evidence in an adjudicative hearing).  
 86 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012). 
 87 See DOJ INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 17; 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(a)(1), (b)(8)(A)–(B), 2302(B)–(C) 
(2012); 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(c)–(d) (2018). 
 88 Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 
54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002). 
 89 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2012). 
 90 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2018). 
 91 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1). For a discussion on this refer-and-review authority, see Gonzales & Glen, 
supra note 17, at 850; Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, supra note 17, at 130.  
 92 See Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Administration: Attorney General Review of Board of 
Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 18, 21, 23 (2016–2017) (describing political exercises 
of refer-and-review power).  
 93 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 17, at 841. 
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2. Limits of Conventions as a Barrier to Political Control 
The permeability of legal barriers to political influence suggests that the only 
real protection against presidential interference in agency adjudications may rest 
on soft “conventions.”94 But it is not at all clear that these soft norms will be 
sufficient to counterbalance the President’s incentives to control agency 
adjudications. The recent article co-authored by former Attorney General 
Gonzales demonstrates that the convention of independence does not prevent 
agency leadership from celebrating, much less exercising, its power to reverse 
the decisions of lower-level adjudicators.95 Political scientists have documented 
a similar willingness to exercise such review authority in other agencies.96 
Perhaps more disturbing, political actors may circumvent formal review 
altogether by pressuring agency adjudicators directly,97 thereby obscuring the 
exercise of political influence.  
Finally, even if conventions were effective in restraining prior 
administrations, the current President is perhaps singular in his willingness to 
defy such soft norms. If conventional norms were the primary reason why prior 
Presidents refrained from exercising control over agency adjudications, we 
should not be surprised if such restraint dissipates in the current Administration. 
II. EMERGENCE OF PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER AGENCY ADJUDICATION 
The current Administration casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that 
agency adjudications remain impervious to presidential control. Over the past 
year and a half, the Trump Administration has implemented a series of reforms 
promising to fundamentally reshape the adjudication of removal claims in 
immigration courts. This Part begins with section A, analyzing the central role 
that immigration played in the election of President Trump, and the political 
capital he has since invested in achieving his immigration objectives. It then 
describes, in section B, the structure of immigration adjudication in the 
Executive Branch, outlining the role of immigration courts in developing 
 
 94 Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 19 (arguing that conventions, not legal barriers, present 
the only meaningful protection against politicized agency adjudications)  
 95 Gonzales & Glen, supra note 17, at 859, 899. 
 96 See Boyd & Driscoll, supra note 20 (examining exercise of reversal power by politically appointed 
Secretary of Agriculture over ALJ decisions); Krent, supra note 19, at 1084–86; Martin H. Redish & Lawrence 
C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Value of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477, 499 
(1986). 
 97 Barnett, supra note 20, at 818–19 (noting that 26% of ALJs within the Social Security Administration 
and 9% of non-Social Security Administration administrative judges report feeling pressure from agency 
leadership to rule differently). 
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national policy. Finally, it identifies in section C a series of emerging tools the 
Trump Administration has employed to exercise political control over these 
courts to ensure their decisions conform to the President’s policy agenda.  
A. The President’s Immigration Agenda  
President Trump has placed immigration reform at the center of his policy 
agenda. On the campaign trail, he pledged to rid the country of “illegal 
immigrants.”98 Seeking the Republican primary nomination, he promised to 
effectuate “mass deportations,”99 describing at one point a plan to deport all 
undocumented aliens in the United States within two years.100 Even after 
securing the party nomination, Trump returned to these themes again and again. 
At an August 2016 campaign rally in Austin, he attacked his Democratic 
opponent for allegedly endorsing a “catch-and-release” policy to allow aliens to 
remain free while removal proceedings are pending, “massive amnesty in her 
first 100 days,” and “let[ting] people overstay their visas without removal.”101 
He warned: “We must not let it happen . . . . This election will decide whether 
or not we have a border. This election will decide whether or not we have a 
country.”102 The same month, in a speech in Phoenix, he promised: “In a Trump 
Administration all immigration laws will be enforced . . . . [N]o one will be 
immune or exempt from enforcement . . . . Anyone who has entered the United 
States illegally is subject to deportation. That is what it means to have laws and 
to have a country.”103  
Since assuming office, the President has continued to invest significant 
political capital in the achievement of his immigration goals, reiterating his 
commitment to deporting noncitizens repeatedly through Executive orders, 
speeches, and press releases. Within a week of his inauguration, he issued 
Executive Order 13,768, which states: “We cannot faithfully execute the 
immigration laws of the United States if we exempt classes or categories of 
 
 98 See Nick Gass, Trump’s Immigration Plan: Mass Deportation, POLITICO (Aug. 17, 2015, 6:25 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/donald-trump-immigration-plan-121420; Donald J. Trump, 
Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Immigration-
Reform-Trump.pdf. 
 99 Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Messy Legal Process Could Challenge Trump’s Mass Deportation Plan, FOX 
NEWS (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/11/27/messy-legal-process-could-challenge-
trumps-mass-deportation-plan.html. 
 100 Julia Preston et al., What Would It Take for Donald Trump to Deport 11 Million and Build a Wall? 
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/us/politics/donald-trump-immigration.html.  
 101 Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Luedecke Arena in Austin, Texas (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Immigration at the Phoenix Convention Center in Phoenix, Arizona 
(Aug. 31, 2016). 
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removable aliens from potential enforcement.”104 The Order continues: “It is the 
policy of the [E]xecutive [B]ranch to . . . [e]nsure the faithful execution of 
immigration laws . . . against all removable aliens.”105  
His cabinet appointees have been equally clear in the Administration’s 
policy commitments, particularly Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who played a 
central role in the development of Trump’s immigration policy agenda during 
the campaign.106 In remarks at the Mexican border in April 2017, Sessions 
stated, “[u]nder the President’s leadership and through his Executive Orders, we 
will secure this border and bring the full weight of both the immigration courts 
and federal criminal enforcement to combat this attack on our national security 
and sovereignty.”107 He continued: “For those that continue to seek improper 
and illegal entry into this country, be forewarned: This is a new era. This is the 
Trump era. The lawlessness, the abdication of the duty to enforce our 
immigration laws and the catch and release practices of old are over.”108 In these 
ways, the President and his political appointees have staked much of the 
Administration’s political future on its success in removing noncitizens from the 
United States.  
B. Immigration Courts 
Immigration courts play a key role in the Trump Administration’s ability to 
achieve its immigration goals. There are an estimated eleven million aliens 
currently residing in the United States without authorization, either because they 
entered without inspection or remained after their visas expired.109 Moreover, an 
estimated 1.9 million aliens (the Administration suggests two or three million)—
most of whom are present lawfully and many of whom are longtime legal 
permanent residents—are subject to deportation based on non-immigration 
related conduct such as the commission of crimes.110 For the vast majority of 
 
 104 Exec. Order 13,768, § 1 (2017). 
 105 Id. § 2(a) (emphasis added). 
 106 Amber Phillips, 10 Things to Know About Sen. Jeff Sessions, Donald Trump’s Pick for Attorney 
General, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/18/10-
things-to-know-about-sen-jeff-sessions-donald-trumps-pick-for-attorney-general/ (explaining the role that 
Sessions played in creating the Trump campaign’s immigration policy positions). 
 107 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks Announcing the Department of Justice’s Renewed 
Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Remarks at Nogales].. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Passel & Cohn, supra note 1. 
 110 Chishti & Mittelstadt, supra note 2. 
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these individuals, the immigration courts will be the final arbiter regarding 
whether they will be deported from the country or permitted to remain.111  
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) vests power in immigration 
judges (IJs) to conduct removal proceedings.112 Lacking the robust tenure 
protections of Article III judges113 or even ALJs,114 an immigration judge is 
defined as “an attorney whom the Attorney General appoints” and who is 
“subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney 
General shall prescribe”.115 According to EOIR, the agency within the 
Department of Justice in which immigration judges serve, there are 
approximately 330 such judges in 58 immigration courts across the nation.116  
These trial-level officials determine in the first instance whether a given 
noncitizen falls within one of the expansive statutory grounds for being 
“inadmissible”117 or “deportable,”118 as charged by Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) prosecutors.119 If so, they determine whether the individual is 
eligible for, and warrants, a discretionary grant of relief from removal.120 In 
some cases, they also are charged with determining whether a detained alien 
should be released on bond or parole pending the outcome of removal 
proceedings.121 Noncitizen-respondents as well as government prosecutors may 
appeal an adverse determination by the IJ to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), an appellate body currently consisting of twenty-one members appointed 
 
 111 See supra note 11 (describing denial of immigration court hearings for certain classes of removable 
noncitizens). 
 112 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012). 
 113 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 114 See Barnett et al., supra note 20, at 7–8 (describing independence of ALJs as compared to other agency 
adjudicators such as immigration judges). 
 115 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012). 
 116 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-
the-chief-immigration-judge (last visited Aug. 20, 2018). 
 117 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012). 
 118 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012). 
 119 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012) (“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the 
inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (“Unless otherwise specified in this 
chapter, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an 
alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United 
States.”); see also EOIR: AN AGENCY GUIDE, supra note 5 (describing role of DHS attorneys in prosecuting 
removal proceedings); ABA, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 1–9 (same). 
 120 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (addressing immigration judge authority to review applications for relief 
from removal); see also, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (setting forth statutory prerequisites for 
discretionary grants of relief from removal in the form of asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (same for 
discretionary grants of relief from removal based on crimes); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (2012) (same for 
discretionary grants of relief in the form of cancellation of removal).  
 121 See supra note 9. 
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by the Attorney General.122 In a limited set of cases, a noncitizen may appeal an 
adverse ruling by the BIA to the federal courts of appeals.123 In 2016 alone, 
nearly 330,000 new matters were filed in immigration courts, including over 
237,000 new removal proceedings and over 63,000 bond determinations.124 The 
political, demographic, and humanitarian interests at stake in removal 
proceedings are massive.  
C. Emerging Tools to Influence Immigration Adjudication 
The central importance of immigration courts to national immigration policy 
has led the current Administration to expand political control over removal 
proceedings. Attorney General Jeff Sessions has addressed these courts 
repeatedly to emphasize the President’s policy priorities. In remarks during the 
EOIR’s Legal Training Program, he asserted, “[a]ll of us should agree that, by 
definition, we ought to have zero illegal immigration in this country,” and 
reminded IJs in attendance that they are required to “conduct designated 
proceedings ‘subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the 
Attorney General shall prescribe.’”125 To that end, the Administration has 
instituted wide-ranging reforms, eliminating the power of IJs to grant 
“administrative closure” in cases; altering the procedures and standards for 
considering asylum claims; purporting to prohibit the release of detained aliens; 
and implementing a series of managerial reforms including an ambitious hiring 
initiative, the introduction of performance metrics, and additional supervisory 
measures to ensure that the decisions of immigration judges conform to the 
President’s immigration agenda. Consistent with Trump’s campaign promise to 
deport all “illegals,” these reforms appear designed to maximize the number of 
noncitizens ordered deported and minimize the number who are allowed to 
remain in the United States.  
 
 122 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2018) (establishing seventeen-member Board of Immigration Appeals); 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1) (2018) (allowing for either party to appeal IJ decisions to the BIA); Executive Office for 
Immigration Review: Expanding the Size of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 83 Fed. Reg. 8321, 8321 (Feb. 
27, 2018) (expanding BIA membership to 21).  
 123 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2012) (denying judicial review over, inter alia, denials of discretionary relief 
from removal and decisions involving criminal aliens); see generally Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues 
in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1664 (2000) (identifying limitations on judicial review over removal 
orders). 
 124 EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 10, at A7. 
 125 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review Legal 
Training Program in Washington, D.C. (June 11, 2018) [hereinafter Sessions Remarks at Legal Training].  
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1. Administrative Closure  
Attorney General Sessions has acted to eliminate IJs’ power to grant 
temporary relief from removal in the form of “administrative closure” in 
removal proceedings.126 IJs had used this device since at least the late 1980s to 
remove a case from the court’s active docket, meaning that removal proceedings 
would be halted unless and until a DHS prosecutor acted to reinstate 
proceedings.127 As the Fifth Circuit noted, “administrative closure may be 
appropriate to await an action or event that is relevant to immigration 
proceedings but is outside the control of the parties or the court and may not 
occur for a significant or undetermined period of time.”128 The prototypical case 
in which such relief might be awarded would be for an undocumented alien with 
a legal permanent resident spouse whose application for naturalization is 
pending.129 An immigration judge might administratively close removal 
proceedings against such an individual given that the alien will become eligible 
for permanent resident status as soon as the spouse’s naturalization application 
is approved.130 Immigration courts thus used this tool as a matter of docket 
control,131 ensuring that only high-priority cases, i.e., those in which the alien 
had little likelihood of obtaining legal status, remained on the active docket.132 
In fiscal year 2016, 35% of all initial case completions in removal proceedings 
resulted in an administrative closure.133 According to the Attorney General, IJs 
and the BIA granted administrative closure in more than 215,000 cases over the 
six years preceding October 2017.134  
In May of 2018, however, the Attorney General exercised refer-and-review 
authority in Castro-Tum, involving a grant of administrative closure to an 
 
 126 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 281 (A.G. 2018). 
 127 Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 695 (BIA 2012); In re W-Y-U, 27 I. & N. Dec. 17, 17–18 (BIA 2017).  
 128 Hernandez-Castillo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 199, 207 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 129 Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 696. 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. at 694 (characterizing administrative closure as “a tool to regulate proceedings, that is, to manage 
an Immigration Judge’s calendar (or the Board’s docket)”). 
 132 Id. at 696 (listing considerations for granting administrative closure as “including but not limited to: 
(1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure; (3) the 
likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he or she is pursuing outside 
of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if any, 
in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for 
example, termination of the proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is re[-]calendared before the 
Immigration Judge or the appeal is reinstated before the Board”).  
 133 The total number of initial case completions in removal proceedings was 137,875, of which 48,285 
resulted in administrative closure. EOIR 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 10, at C2, C5.  
 134 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018). 
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unaccompanied minor.135 In that case, the IJ at the trial level granted 
administrative closure, but the BIA vacated on appeal by the government.136 
Rather than letting the BIA opinion stand, Attorney General Sessions requested 
briefing from the parties and interested amici on the legality of administrative 
closure generally.137 In his final decision, Sessions concluded that neither IJs nor 
the BIA possess authority to grant this form of relief.138   
2. Asylum Claims 
The Attorney General has also reshaped the adjudication of asylum claims 
after repeatedly expressing skepticism over the credibility of such claimants. In 
remarks to the EOIR, Sessions asserted, “We . . . have dirty immigration lawyers 
who are encouraging their otherwise unlawfully present clients to make false 
claims of asylum . . . .”139 According to him, “[s]aying a few simple words 
[establishing a credible fear of persecution] is now transforming a 
straightforward arrest and immediate return into a probable release and a hearing 
. . . .”140 He was especially critical of the high rates at which aliens succeed in 
establishing a credible fear of persecution, stating that “any adjudicatory system 
with a grant rate of nearly [90%] is inherently flawed.”141 He repeated these 
sentiments in a more recent speech before the EOIR, asserting that “the vast 
majority of the current asylum claims are not valid,” and characterizing “abuse” 
of the asylum system as “one of our major difficulties today.”142 
To that end, he has twice exercised the refer-and-review power to influence 
asylum adjudications. In In re E-F-H-L-, he vacated a BIA decision holding that 
asylum claimants are entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish their 
claims.143 At the trial level, the IJ concluded that respondent’s written 
application for relief failed to establish a prima facie claim for asylum and thus 
denied an evidentiary hearing.144 On review, the BIA in 2014 vacated and 
remanded, emphasizing regulations making clear that asylum applications shall 
 
 135 Id. at 273. 
 136 Id. at 277–80. 
 137 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 187, 187 (A.G. 2018). 
 138 Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 281, 292–93 (A.G. 2018). 
 139 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review in Falls 
Church, Va. (Oct. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Remarks at Falls Church]. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id.  
 142 Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125.  
 143 In re E-F-H-L-, 27 I.& N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018). 
 144 Id. 
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be determined “after an evidentiary hearing.”145 In a precedent-setting published 
opinion, it concluded, “in the ordinary course of removal proceedings, an 
applicant for asylum . . . is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the applications, 
including an opportunity to provide oral testimony and other evidence, without 
first having to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.”146 Four 
years later, on March 5, 2018, the Attorney General—with no apparent notice to 
respondent or other interested parties—vacated the BIA’s decision on the 
ground that the applicant had since withdrawn his asylum application (to pursue 
lawful status on the basis of a family relationship), which in his opinion rendered 
the BIA’s decision “moot.”147 In doing so, Sessions summarily eliminated the 
precedential decision entitling asylum seekers to an evidentiary hearing before 
an IJ.  
The Attorney General also utilized the refer-and-review mechanism to reject 
the BIA’s longstanding precedent in In re A-B-.148 For years, the BIA had held 
that victims of domestic violence could in certain circumstances qualify as being 
persecuted on the basis of membership in a “particular social group” for 
purposes of obtaining asylum.149 In June of this year, however, the Attorney 
General overruled that precedent, promulgating a new interpretation of the 
asylum statute to exclude victims of private crimes.150 His opinion states: 
Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang 
violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for 
asylum. While I do not decide that violence inflicted by non-
governmental actors may never serve as a basis for an asylum or 
withholding [from removal] application based on membership in a 
particular social group, in practice such claims are unlikely to satisfy 
the statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the 
government is unable or unwilling to address. The mere fact that a 
country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such 
as domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations are 
more likely to be victims or crime, cannot itself establish an asylum 
claim.151 
In these ways, the Administration has exerted control over the adjudication of 
asylum claims in immigration courts.  
 
 145 In re E-F-H-L-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323–24 (BIA 2014). 
 146 Id. at 324. 
 147 In re E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 226. 
 148 In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018).  
 149 See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391–92 (BIA 2014).  
 150 In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320.  
 151 Id. 
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3. Detention 
The current Administration has also purported to prohibit the release of 
noncitizens pending the outcome of removal proceedings. Pursuant to statute, 
large segments of the removable population are subject to mandatory 
detention.152 For those who are not subject to mandatory detention, enforcement 
officials within the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) determine in the first instance whether the individual will be 
detained or released on bond or parole pending removal proceedings.153 Once 
charges are filed in immigration court, the noncitizen is entitled to seek a bond 
rehearing before the immigration judge,154 in which the judge engages in an 
individualized determination as to whether the alien poses a flight risk or danger 
to the community.155  
Almost immediately upon assuming office however, President Trump 
announced through Executive Order 13,767, “[i]t is the policy of the [E]xecutive 
[B]ranch to . . . detain individuals apprehended on suspicion of violating Federal 
or State law, including Federal immigration law, pending further proceedings 
regarding those violations.”156 Subsequently, Attorney General Sessions 
specified, “we will now be detaining all adults who are apprehended at the 
border.”157  
The extent to which IJs—or indeed enforcement officers within ICE—are 
complying with this directive remains unclear. Certainly, not all aliens in 
removal proceedings are being detained; and among those who were detained at 
one point, a nontrivial number have subsequently been released.158 Nonetheless, 
immigration court records compiled by the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) show a dramatic increase in the percentage of 
noncitizens in removal proceedings who are detained. In April 2018, the most 
 
 152 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (sustaining 
mandatory detention provisions against statutory and constitutional challenge). 
 153 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1) (2018). 
 154 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1(d) (2018). For an empirical study examining the decision-making of IJs 
in bond proceedings, see Ryo, Detained Study, supra note 9. 
 155 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRIGATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 
IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 141 (“If the alien is eligible for bond, the 
Immigration Judge considers whether the alien’s release would pose a danger to property or persons, whether 
the alien is likely to appear for further immigration proceedings, and whether the alien is a threat to national 
security.”), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2017/11/02/practicemanual.pdf# 
page=146. 
 156 Exec. Order 13,767, § 2(b)–(c) (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 157 Sessions Remarks at Nogales, supra note 107. 
 158 See infra Figure 1. 
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recent month for which full data are available, 41% of all removal cases involved 
a detained alien, as compared to only 18% in April 2016 during the prior 
administration.159 At the same time, the number of aliens who previously were 
detained but had since been released, as a percentage of all aliens in removal 
proceedings, dropped to 16% in April 2018 from 21% two years prior.160 Figure 
1 below shows the total number of aliens detained in cases initiated in each 
month of the Trump Administration and the last year of the preceding 
Administration; it also shows the total number of aliens released after detention 
in such cases.161  
The divergence between the number of noncitizens detained versus the 
number released after prior detention is particularly surprising given that the 
current Administration purports to no longer prioritize categories of aliens for 
removal.162 One would expect that the current Administration’s decision to cast 
a wider net—initiating removal proceedings against aliens regardless of criminal 
history or length of residence in the United States—would lead to a higher 
number of aliens released pending removal proceedings than in prior years, 
when removals targeted criminal aliens who arguably pose a higher risk to 
 
 159 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta/ (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2018) (on file with author). 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE 
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 1 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/2017 
(stating that the DHS has “directed that classes or categories of removable aliens are no longer exempted from 
potential enforcement”). 
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community safety or recent arrivals who arguably pose a higher flight risk. Yet 
the evidence suggests precisely the opposite. Today, even though a longtime 
lawful resident with a minor drug conviction arguably is as likely to be subject 
to removal proceedings as a violent criminal, aliens as a whole are far less likely 
to be released after detention than in prior years.  
Importantly, the data do not identify whether a decision to release was made 
by enforcement officers within DHS or in bond rehearings before IJs. Thus, 
much of the shift may be attributable to DHS employing a more aggressive 
detention policy.163 IJs retain, however, formal authority to release any alien who 
is not subject to statutory mandatory detention provisions,164 and the low rates 
of releases are not likely to be due to enforcement officers alone. Indeed, a 
lawsuit filed in January 2018 alleges that some IJs have begun to refuse to 
conduct bond rehearings altogether.165 
4. Managerial Reforms to Reduce Backlog of Pending Cases 
The Trump Administration has also instituted a series of reforms to address 
a mounting backlog of cases pending in the immigration courts. As of June 2018, 
there was a backlog of 700,000 cases, triple the figure from nine years prior.166 
In response, the Attorney General has launched an ambitious hiring initiative 
and acted to significantly limit case processing times. While ostensibly 
managerial, these reforms are likely to alter outcomes in individual immigration 
proceedings. 
Hiring Initiative. In April 2017, the Attorney General announced a “new, 
streamlined hiring plan” to dramatically expand the number of immigration 
judges.167 As of November 2017, the Administration had hired more than 61 
new IJs—1/5 of the current IJ corps168—and plans to hire 100 more in 2018.169 
At the administrative appeals level, the Administration has expanded the Board 
of Immigration Appeals, which determines which decisions to publish as 
 
 163 See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. (Feb. 20, 2017). 
 164 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.41(a) (2018). 
 165 Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
at 2, Palacios v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-00026 (W.D.N.C. 2018). 
 166 Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125. 
 167 Sessions Remarks at Nogales, supra note 107. 
 168 McHenry Testimony, supra note 80, at 3.  
 169 Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125. 
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precedents by majority vote,170 from seventeen members to twenty-one 
members.171  
Details have not yet emerged on how current hiring practices depart from 
past procedures, and whether they avoid the legal pitfalls associated with the 
politicized hiring practices documented in the Inspector General 2008 report.172 
In April 2018, however, congressional Democrats sent a letter to the Department 
of Justice expressing concern that the Department may be screening candidates 
on political or ideological grounds.173 The letter cites reports of individuals who 
were appointed to the immigration bench during the Obama Administration 
pending background checks, but whose applications subsequently were subject 
to extended delays and in at least one case ultimately rejected with little 
explanation.174 While the Department of Justice has denied the allegations, 
members of Congress continue to press for an independent investigation.175  
Even assuming current practices avoid the use of ideology or political 
affiliation in hiring, these new IJ hires do not enjoy the same level of 
independence as longtime members of this administrative bench. All new IJs 
serve a two-year probationary period before enjoying civil service protections, 
unlike most types of non-ALJ adjudicators, who have no probationary period at 
all.176 Moreover, Attorney General Sessions has taken pains to point out to IJs 
that they serve at his pleasure, reminding them during their Legal Training 
Program that they are “subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties 
as the Attorney General shall prescribe.”177 In addition, the Administration has 
instituted structural changes to expand oversight over IJs serving in the field, 
increasing the number of supervisors while also creating a new Office of Policy 
within EOIR to “better coordinate initiatives to address the case load, to 
 
 170 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2018).  
 171 Executive Office for Immigration Review: Expanding the Size of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
83 Fed. Reg. 8321, 8321 (Feb. 27, 2018).  
 172 See DOJ INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 173 Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Lloyd Doggett, Joaquin Castro, & Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Members of 
Cong., to Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 17, 2018). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Applicant Says Trump Administration Blocked Her over Politics CNN: 
POLITICS (June 21, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politics/immigration-judge-applicant-
says-trump-administration-blocked-her-over-politics/index.html. 
 176 Compare Oversight of the Executive Office of Immigration Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) 
(statement of Kevin A. Ohlson, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review), https://judiciary.house.gov/_files/ 
hearings/pdf/JointDOJ080923.pdf (noting two-year probationary period for newly hired IJs), with BARNETT ET 
AL., supra note 20, at 40 (noting that of the thirty-seven types of non-ALJ adjudicators identified across federal 
agencies, only seventeen are placed on probation upon hiring). 
 177 Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125. 
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eliminate existing process redundancies across multiple components, and to 
more effectively oversee strategic planning, analytics, and internal 
communications.”178  
Expediting Case Processing. Consistent with President Trump’s stated 
policy of “expedit[ing] determinations of apprehended individuals’ claims of 
eligibility to remain in the United States,”179 the Administration has initiated 
reforms to significantly limit case processing times. After renegotiating the 
collective bargaining agreement with the IJs’ union to eliminate prohibitions on 
measuring and evaluating individual performance,180 the Attorney General 
imposed new performance metrics for these judges.181 Pursuant to these metrics, 
an IJ will be evaluated as having “satisfactory performance” only if he or she 
satisfies three measures.182 First, he or she must complete at least 700 cases each 
year.183 Second, remand rates by the BIA or the circuit courts must be less than 
15%.184 Third, he or she must meet at least half of a list of performance 
benchmarks such as completing 85% of detained removal cases within three 
days of the merits hearing; holding merits hearings on the initial scheduled 
hearing date in 95% of all cases; and completing all reviews of preliminary 
credible fear and reasonable fear assessments on the initial hearing date.185  
These performance metrics build on separate efforts to limit immigration 
judges’ ability to enter continuances in cases. In July 2017, the Administration 
amended the Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum governing 
immigration courts to require judges to submit written documentation showing 
“good cause” warranting the grant of any continuance.186 Although a recent 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the 
vast majority of continuances were due to resource constraints on the part of 
 
 178 McHenry Testimony, supra note 80, at 5. 
 179 Exec. Order 13,767, § 2(c) (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 180 Maria Sacchetti, Immigration Judges Say Proposed Quotas from Justice Dept. Threaten Independence, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/immigration-judges-say-
proposed-quotas-from-justice-dept-threaten-independence/2017/10/12/3ed86992-aee1-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e 
9ffb_story.html. 
 181 Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S Dep’t of Justice, to the Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review (Dec. 5, 2017). 
 182 Memorandum from James R. McHenry, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to All Immigration 
Judges, Exec. Office for Immigration Review (Mar. 30, 2018). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, 
to All Immigration Judges et al., Exec. Office for Immigration Review (Jul. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Keller 
Memorandum] (detailing new policies and procedures regarding continuances); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2018) 
(providing that immigration judges may grant continuances where “good cause shown”). 
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immigration courts themselves,187 the memorandum targets those requested by 
noncitizen respondents as warranting particular scrutiny, including those 
requested to obtain counsel or for attorney preparation.188  
Then, in March 2018, the Attorney General indicated his intent to review the 
BIA’s decision in In re L-A-B-R-, requesting parties to brief the issue of whether 
“good cause” exists for an IJ to grant a continuance in a removal proceeding to 
allow a collateral matter—such as a pending petition for legal permanent 
resident status—to be adjudicated.189 In August, the Attorney General issued a 
final opinion, emphasizing that “the good-cause requirement is an important 
check on immigration judges’ authority that reflects the public interest in 
expeditious enforcement of the immigration laws . . . .”190 While he concluded 
that the decision on a motion for a continuance should turn primarily on “the 
likelihood that the alien will receive the pursued collateral relief” and that such 
“relief will materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings,” he also 
directed courts to consider other factors, including “DHS’s position on the 
motion for continuance [and] concerns of administrative efficiency.”191 In doing 
so, he rejected the BIA’s interpretation of the Third Circuit’s opinion in Hashmi 
v. Attorney General, which held that denying a continuance solely to achieve 
case-completion goals was “impermissibly arbitrary.”192 The Attorney General 
concluded that while case-completion goals should not constitute the sole reason 
for a denial, they should be considered as one of several factors in the 
decision.193 Additionally, he specified that continuances should be denied where 
the collateral relief sought constitutes a challenge to a criminal conviction or 
where the noncitizen respondent has a pending application for a family- or 
employment-based visa that is currently unavailable due to backlogs.194 In these 
ways, the Attorney General ensured that the good-cause standard imposes a 
robust “substantive requirement” to “limit[] the discretion of immigration 
judges.”195  
Whether this set of reforms can appropriately be characterized as politically 
influenced may be contested. No one disputes that immigration courts suffer 
from extraordinary backlogs and have long been in desperate need for reform. 
 
 187 GAO 2017 REPORT, supra note 14. 
 188 Keller Memorandum, supra note 186, at 4–5.  
 189 In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 245, 245 (A.G. 2018).  
 190 In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. 405, 406 (A.G. 2018). 
 191 Id. at 415.  
 192 531 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 193 27 I. & N. at 416–17. 
 194 Id. at 417–18.  
 195 Id. at 405. 
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Currently, over 700,000 cases are pending in the immigration courts.196 In 2015, 
the median case completion time stood at 286 days.197 From this perspective, 
reforms focused on the timely and efficient resolution of cases may constitute 
precisely the sort of managerial oversight we would demand from the leadership 
in any hierarchical organization. 
Yet in the context of immigration cases, limits on the length of removal 
proceedings are inextricably linked to case outcomes, heavily favoring 
deportation rather than relief from removal.198 In the adversarial system between 
the government and a noncitizen-respondent, time limits on proceedings almost 
always work in favor of the government because in the vast majority of cases, 
the noncitizen’s inadmissibility or deportability is not at issue. Grounds for 
removal, such as a lack of a valid visa or the existence of a criminal conviction, 
are relatively easy to establish. Consequently, the bulk of proceedings focus on 
whether the alien is eligible for, and warrants, a grant of discretionary relief from 
removal.199 The alien bears the burden on this issue and must develop evidence 
to show, for example, a reasonable fear of persecution if removed, strong ties to 
the community, work history, or hardship to U.S. family members if removal 
were effectuated.200  
The Administration itself has acknowledged the connection between the 
length of removal proceedings and case outcomes. In a document entitled 
“Backgrounder on EOIR Strategies for Caseload Reduction Plan,” the 
Administration attributes the backlog in immigration proceedings to 
 
 196 See Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125; see also McHenry Testimony, supra note 80 
(noting that in October 2017, approximately 640,000 cases remained pending in the immigration courts).  
 197 GAO 2017 REPORT, supra note 14. The GAO Report notes that the median time to completion for cases 
involving detained individuals, which are prioritized for case processing, was only 28 days, but the median time 
for non-detained cases was 535 days. Id. at 26. 
 198 By contrast, limits on case processing times have the opposite effect in disability adjudications in the 
Social Security Administration, where the burden of proof rests on the government. See HAROLD J. KRENT & 
SCOTT MORRIS, ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 50–51, 54 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/Achieving_Greater_Consistency_Final_Report_4-3-2013_clean.pdf. 
 199 See ABA, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 2–9 (“In practice, many cases are 
resolved at the master calendar hearing, if the respondent admits to removability and only seeks voluntary 
departure. However, if removability is disputed or if relief other than voluntary departure is sought, the 
proceeding enters the second stage—an individual hearing on the merits, which is usually set for a separate date. 
At this hearing, the immigration judge makes a decision based on evidence and facts disputed by the respondent 
and on any other matters deemed relevant.”) (footnote omitted).  
 200 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)–(B) (2012); see also, e.g., Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 467, 468, 472–73 
(BIA 2002) (holding that a single mother was eligible for cancelation of removal “because she demonstrated 
that her United States citizen children . . . will suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon her 
removal to her native country”); Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (BIA 1978) (outlining factors favorable to 
an alien in removal proceedings). 
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discretionary grants of relief from removal, which “have slowed down the 
adjudication . . . and incentivized further illegal immigration.”201 Moreover, the 
pressure to resolve cases quickly cannot be extricated from the Administration’s 
repeated assertions that removal proceedings are plagued by meritless claims 
filed by noncitizens. The Attorney General has been particularly vocal in his 
conviction that baseless asylum claims are a major cause of the backlog in 
removal proceedings.202 The Administration has also expressed skepticism 
toward claims brought by unaccompanied alien children (UACs) entitled to 
special protections. Recent amendments to the Operating Policies and Procedure 
Manual emphasize, “there is an incentive to misrepresent accompaniment status 
or age in order to attempt to qualify for the benefits associated with UAC status” 
and direct IJs to “be vigilant in adjudicating cases of a purported UAC.”203 These 
statements suggest that managerial and structural reforms targeting timely case 
completions are not expected to be outcome-neutral. IJs plausibly will feel 
pressure to expedite deportation orders, rather than to expedite relief from 
removal. 
It is still too early to assess the extent to which these reforms have influenced 
particular case outcomes, but the initial data suggest a correlation. According to 
statistics released by the Department of Justice, immigration courts issued 
127,570 final decisions between February 1, 2017 and November 30, 2017, a 
16.6% increase from the same period the prior year.204 The total number of 
removal orders issued in that time period (87,063), by contrast, grew by 30% as 
compared to the prior year.205 These figures suggest that the percentage of 
completed cases resulting in a removal order was far higher in 2017 than in 
2016.206  
 
 201 Backgrounder on EOIR Strategic Caseload Reduction Plan, supra note 4. 
 202 Sessions Remarks at Falls Church, supra note 139. 
 203 Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, 
to All Immigration Judges et al., Exec. Office for Immigration Review (Dec. 20, 2017) (detailing new policies 
and procedures regarding juveniles and UACs). The memorandum also instructs IJs not to grant relief from 
removal solely on the basis of “the best interest of the child.” Id. It further states that “[a]lthough juvenile cases 
may present sympathetic allegations, Immigration Judges must be mindful that they are unbiased arbitrators of 
the law and not advocates for either party . . . .” Id. It asserts, “although vague, speculative, or generalized 
testimony by a child witness is not necessarily an indicator of dishonesty,” “legal requirements, including 
credibility standards and burdens of proof, are not relaxed or obviated for juvenile respondents” and such 
vagueness and generality in a child’s testimony may “be insufficient by itself to be found credible or to meet an 
applicable burden of proof.” Id. 
 204 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Sessions Issues Memo 
Outlining Principles to Ensure that the Adjudication of Immigration Cases Serves the National Interest (Dec. 6, 
2017). 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
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Contrary to conventional assumptions, the Trump Administration has sought 
to ensure that the removal of noncitizens are controlled not by independent 
adjudicators, but rather by the Administration’s political leadership. Presidential 
administration has finally penetrated agency adjudications. 
III. ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL ADJUDICATION 
Setting aside one’s policy view on whether we should be deporting more, or 
fewer, noncitizens from the United States, the Trump Administration’s reforms 
to immigration proceedings raise thorny normative questions about the extent to 
which agency adjudications should be insulated from political influence.207 
While commentators often assert that agency adjudicators must be independent 
from presidential control,208 this Article argues that the normative assessment is 
more complex. This Part begins by setting forth the normative factors at stake 
when administrative adjudications become politicized. It then evaluates the 
recent immigration court reforms against these metrics.  
A. The Normative Stakes 
Our legal culture imposes a heavy presumption of adjudicative 
independence from politics.209 The demand for such independence is less 
absolute in the administrative context than in the Article III context, however.210 
The extent to which agency adjudications are insulated from political 
interference should accommodate both the need to protect the interests of the 
individual as well as the need for democratic accountability.211 It should also 
adhere to the separation-of-powers principles necessary to protect against 
arbitrary unilateral action.212  
 
 207 For an empirical inquiry into public norms about the legitimacy of Executive actions, see Cary 
Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into Norms About Executive 
Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2016). 
 208 Supra note 21 (listing sources). 
 209 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing life tenure and salary protections for federal judges); 
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining need to protect judiciary from political 
influence).  
 210 See generally PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 79, at 1004–06 (describing differences between 
Article III adjudication and federal agency adjudication). See also F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to 
Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. L. REV. 715, 725–29 (2018) (same); Mila Sohoni, Agency 
Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. L. REV. 1569, 1581–84 (2013) (same).  
 211 Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 17, at 390 (acknowledging cost of decisional 
independence on norms of political accountability); Taylor, supra note 22, at 485 (noting trade-off between 
decisional independence and policy consistency and uniformity). 
 212 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1036–
39 (2011) (examining importance of allocation of power between actors within a given agency); Gillian E. 
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1. Democratic Responsiveness and Protecting Individual Interests  
The degree to which agency adjudications are insulated from presidential 
influence should reflect, in part, a context-specific balancing between the need 
to protect individual interests on the one hand and norms of electoral 
responsiveness on the other.213  
Advocates of presidential control over agency decision-making generally 
argue that such control helps ensure that the decisions of unelected bureaucrats 
are held to democratic account. As Kagan described, “presidential leadership 
establishes an electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing 
the latter’s responsiveness to the former.”214 The Supreme Court itself relied on 
this premise to justify judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutory 
ambiguities in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council: 
“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive 
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to 
make such policy choices . . . .”215 From this view, presidential control 
legitimates agency decision-making by ensuring that such decisions are 
responsive to the electorate.  
This democratic-accountability claim surfaces most frequently in defenses 
of presidential control over agency rulemaking, but it arguably applies to agency 
adjudications as well. Agency adjudicators are not limited to resolving disputes 
between discrete parties; as described in section I.C., they may also establish 
binding national policy.216 To the extent the policy’s legitimacy rests on being 
traceable to the democratically accountable President, such legitimacy would 
not appear to depend on whether the policy was promulgated through 
adjudication rather than rulemaking.217 
Yet even if one accepts the primacy of democratic accountability as the 
touchstone of legitimacy, the extent to which presidential control actually 
 
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 
423, 429–30 (2009) [hereinafter Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship] (examining importance of internal 
separation of powers to empower external actors to keep Executive power in check).  
 213 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962) (coining term “countermajoritarian difficulty” to describe inherent tension 
between adjudicative system and norms of electoral governance).  
 214 Kagan, supra note 19, at 2332; see also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE 
UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 75–76 (2010); Pierce, Jr., supra note 28, at 114–15; Watts, supra 
note 28, at 688–89, 692. 
 215 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 216 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.  
 217 Vermeule, Agency Independence, supra note 19, at 1212. 
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renders agency decisions more responsive to the electorate is contested.218 In the 
rulemaking context, political scientists have noted the weak connection between 
a presidential victory and electoral preferences for a specific policy choice, e.g., 
ramped-up removal of noncitizens.219 The adjudicative context exacerbates this 
disconnect, as adjudications simply are less publicly salient than rulemaking.220 
More fundamentally, agency adjudications differ from rulemaking actions 
because the legitimacy of the former does not rest entirely—or even primarily—
on notions of democratic accountability. Even Kagan, who famously 
championed the presidential control model, conceded that in the context of 
adjudications, “which apply to and affect discrete individuals and firms,” 
“presidential participation in . . . whatever form, would contravene procedural 
norms and inject an inappropriate influence into the resolution of 
controversies.”221 A recent report published by the National Association of the 
Administrative Law Judiciary describes the importance of individual protections 
in agency adjudications:  
Ultimately, administrative adjudication . . . is about the delivery of due 
process to the individuals and businesses that are subject to 
government regulation . . . . A strong commitment to ensuring the 
independence of the administrative adjudicator . . . is the greatest 
protection for our citizens, and the most important assurance of due 
process for taxpayers and businesses that rely upon independent 
administrative judges to resolve fairly and impartially their disputes 
with the government.222 
From this perspective, the legitimacy of agency adjudications rests in large part 
on the adjudicative process’s ability to protect individual interests against 
majoritarian preferences. 
A pair of early cases familiar to students of administrative law illustrates this 
principle. In Londoner v. City of Denver, the Supreme Court held that due 
process required an oral hearing for property owners before a tax assessment 
could be imposed on them.223 In Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization of Colorado, by contrast, the Court held that property owners 
 
 218 See Kitrosser, supra note 21. 
 219 See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency 
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 450 (2010). 
 220 Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living, Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 
255–56 (1986) (noting that adjudication is less publicly salient than rulemaking).  
 221 Kagan, supra note 19, at 2362–63. 
 222 Gilbert & Cohen, supra note 55, at 254. 
 223 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908). 
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opposing a city-wide increase in the valuation of taxable property were not 
entitled to such due process protections.224 The Court in Bi-Metallic justified its 
departure from Londoner as follows: “In [Londoner, a] relatively small number 
of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon 
individual grounds . . . . But that decision is far from reaching a general 
determination dealing only with the principle upon which all the assessments in 
a county had been laid.”225  
Together, these cases show that the Constitution mandates procedural due 
process protections where a government agency engages in “adjudicative” 
decision-making, impacting specific individuals, but not where the agency 
engages in “legislative” decision-making, which is broadly applicable to the 
public at large. As others have explained, this distinction rests on a particular 
view of the political process as incapable of protecting the interests of discrete 
individuals against majoritarian politics; an individual targeted by a government 
action is unlikely to be able to mobilize the broad support sufficient to protect 
her interests through the ballot box.226 In these circumstances, the only way to 
protect the individual’s interest is to provide due process, which at its most 
fundamental, requires an independent, impartial decision maker.227 The lesson 
from Londoner and Bi-Metallic is that majoritarian preferences simply do not 
play the same dominating role in adjudicative decisions; on the contrary, they 
may need to give way to protect the interests of individual parties in a 
proceeding.  
Justice Powell’s concurrence in INS v. Chadha similarly articulates a theory 
of adjudication rooted in the need to protect individual interests from 
majoritarian preferences.228 Chadha involved the constitutionality of a statute 
which delegated authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation while at 
the same time reserving Congress’s power to override the grant of relief by 
majority vote in either the House or Senate.229 The majority opinion authored by 
Chief Justice Burger invalidated the one-house legislative veto as an 
impermissible exercise of “legislative” power departing from constitutional 
lawmaking requirements of bicameralism and presentment.230 Justice Powell, by 
 
 224 239 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1915). 
 225 Id. at 445–46.  
 226 See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.2, at 743 (5th ed. 2010). 
 227 See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 n.71 (1975) (ranking an 
“unbiased tribunal” as the most important of due process protections).  
 228 462 U.S. 919, 959–60 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 229 Id. at 923–25. 
 230 Id. at 944, 947, 951–52, 958. 
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contrast, concluded that the statute did not constitute an exercise of “legislative” 
power at all, but rather an impermissible exercise by Congress of the 
“adjudicative” power: 
On its face, the House’s action appears clearly adjudicatory. The 
House did not enact a general rule; rather it made its own 
determination that six specific persons did not comply with certain 
statutory criteria . . . . [T]he House’s assumption of this function . . . 
raises the very danger the Framers sought to avoid—the exercise of 
unchecked power. In deciding whether Chadha deserves to be 
deported, Congress is not subject to any internal constraints that 
prevent it from arbitrarily depriving him of the right to remain in the 
country . . . . The only effective constraint on Congress’ power is 
political, but Congress is most accountable politically when it 
prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of 
specific persons, those rights are subject to “the tyranny of a shifting 
majority.”231 
Chadha involved congressional action, but Justice Powell’s concern about the 
fair adjudication of individual interests would seem to apply to decisions 
directed by a politically-motivated President as well.  
In the context of agency adjudications, the balance between democratic 
responsiveness and protections for individual interests simply is not the same 
as in the rulemaking context. It does not follow that an individual’s interest in 
an adjudicative proceeding must always prevail over the will of the majority. 
Rather, the proper balance to strike will be context specific, depending on 
factors such as the significance of the individual interests at stake; the extent to 
which a politicized decision compromises those interests; and the degree to 
which a politicized decision actually reflects the popular will.  
2. Separation of Powers 
The independence of agency adjudications implicates a related set of values: 
those reflected in the structure of separated powers in our Constitution. At the 
level of constitutional actors (President, Congress, and federal courts), agency 
adjudications must remain faithful to the Congress that created the agency and 
vested it with adjudicative authority. At the sub-constitutional level of the 
agency itself, agency adjudicators should enjoy the degree of independence 
necessary to ensure adequate checks and balances against arbitrary unilateral 
action.  
 
 231 Id. at 964–66. 
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Constitutional Actors. Agencies are firmly placed within the Executive 
Branch serving under the President.232 But they are created by, and derive all 
powers from, Congress.233 As such, the legitimacy of any form of agency action 
depends on its fidelity to the goals of the enacting Congress.234 Congress sets 
forth the procedures by which decisions, including adjudications, are to be 
reached. Congress may delegate decision-making to politically insulated ALJs, 
or vest decision-making authority exclusively in a presidential appointee, for 
example.235 It might limit the extent to which presidential appointees can 
overturn the decisions of trial-level adjudicators, or it might grant de novo 
review authority.236  
Congress also establishes particular policy goals in creating the agency. As 
a general matter, independent career bureaucrats, steeped in a professional 
culture defined by the mission of the agencies in which they serve, can protect 
legislative interests when a current President’s goals diverge from those of the 
Congress that enacted an agency’s organic statute.237 Indeed, political scientists 
have characterized the career bureaucracy as central to mediating between 
conflicting goals of Congress and the President.238 While the value of 
bureaucratic independence often is associated with agency expertise in scientific 
and technical fields,239 agency adjudicators also develop expertise given their 
focus on limited categories of cases. Moreover, agency adjudicators who preside 
over the taking of evidence are more likely to develop an accurate assessment of 
the adjudicative facts at issue in a given case.240 For these reasons, preserving 
the independence of agency adjudicators may enhance the legitimacy and 
accuracy of their decisions, particularly where the political goals of the current 
President conflict with Congress’s original intent.241 
 
 232 PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 171–73, 175–76, 179 (3d ed. 
2016).  
 233 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (“[N]o matter how 
important, conspicuous, and controversial the issue, and regardless of how likely the public is to hold the 
Executive Branch politically accountable . . . an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest 
must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.”). 
 234 Id.  
 235 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944) 
 236 See ASIMOW, supra note 54, at 33–34.  
 237 Strauss, The President in Administrative Law, supra note 28, at 703–04.  
 238 See McCubbins et al., supra note 53, at 244. 
 239 Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential 
Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2055 (2015).  
 240 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494 (1951). 
 241 See Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 2018 (2015) (discussing norm of legal coherence to mediate between enacting 
Congress’s goals and the current Administration’s goals). 
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Within the Agency Itself. Even within agencies, which are wholly within the 
Executive Branch, separation-of-powers norms have come to play a crucial role. 
Since at least the New Deal, the Executive Branch has accreted more and more 
power so that it is undeniably the most powerful branch of federal 
government.242 One of the central projects of administrative law has been to 
replicate, within the increasingly powerful Executive Branch, the types of 
checks and balances our constitutional framers mandated between branches.243 
Indeed, Professor Gillian Metzger argues that such internal checks and balances 
are constitutionally required, given the increasing threat of presidential 
unilateralism:  
The administrative state—with its bureaucracy, expert and 
professional personnel, and internal institutional complexity—
performs critical constitutional functions and is the key to an 
accountable, constrained, and effective [E]xecutive [B]ranch . . . 
[T]he administrative state today is constitutionally obligatory, 
rendered necessary by the broad statutory delegations of authority 
to the [E]xecutive [B]ranch that are the defining feature of modern 
government.244  
Pursuant to this view, the independence of career bureaucrats within Executive 
Branch agencies assumes a constitutional dimension.  
Importantly, preserving the independence of agency adjudicators does not 
eliminate the role of political leadership over agencies altogether. On the 
contrary, political appointees may retain meaningful oversight over broad policy 
choices without interfering in the decision-making processes of career 
 
 242 See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1, 1 (1994) (“[T]he institutional system has itself been transformed . . . from a nineteenth century system 
of ‘congressional government’ into a modern, presidentially led bureaucratic state . . . . The hallmark of modern 
U.S. government is presidential leadership.”). 
 243 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch 
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (“A critical mechanism to promote internal separation of powers 
is bureaucracy.”); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old 
and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 235 (2016) (examining relationship between vertical 
separation of powers—involving competition between constitutional branches—and horizontal separation of 
powers—interactions between politically appointed agency leadership, civil service bureaucrats, and civil 
society organizations). For discussion of the relationship between individual rights and separation-of-powers 
norms, see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE 
L.J. 1672, 1727 (2012) (setting forth originalist account of due process rights as designed to enforce separation-
of-powers norms); Jonathan R. Macey, How Separation of Powers Protects Individual Liberties, 41 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 813, 816 (1989) (describing separation of powers as a precondition to a system of checks and balances 
necessary to protect individuals). 
 244 Metzger, The Administrative State Under Siege, supra note 21. 
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adjudicators. The Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. Campbell,245 
involving a denial of disability benefits, illustrates one way that bureaucratic 
independence can co-exist with political leadership. Pursuant to the Social 
Security Act, an individual is entitled to disability payments upon establishing 
at an adjudicative hearing that her physical or mental impairment precludes her 
from pursuing gainful employment in the national economy.246 Historically, 
adjudicators determined the availability of such gainful employment through the 
receipt of expert testimony in individual hearings.247 In 1978, however, the 
agency’s political leadership promulgated regulations setting forth a matrix to 
calculate the types and numbers of jobs existing in the national economy.248 
Campbell challenged the use of this matrix to deny her benefits, arguing that she 
was entitled to present evidence of the absence of jobs at her individualized 
hearing.249 Rejecting her claim, the Supreme Court stated:  
It is true that the statutory scheme contemplates that disability hearings 
will be individualized determinations based on evidence adduced at a 
hearing . . . . But this does not bar the Secretary from relying on 
rulemaking to resolve certain classes of issues. The Court has 
recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly 
requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its own 
rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-
case consideration.250  
Heckler v. Campbell relied on the traditional distinction between adjudicative 
facts, which must be resolved by the adjudicator, and legislative facts, which 
may be resolved by the political leadership. The Court explained:  
The first inquiry involves a determination of historic facts, and the 
regulations properly require the Secretary to make these findings on 
the basis of evidence adduced at a hearing . . . . The second inquiry 
requires the Secretary to determine an issue that is not unique to each 
claimant—the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national 
economy. This type of general factual issue may be resolved as fairly 
through rulemaking as by introducing the testimony of vocational 
experts at each disability hearing.251 
 
 245 461 U.S. 458, 464 (1983). 
 246 Id. at 460. 
 247 Id. at 461. 
 248 Id. at 460–62. 
 249 Id. at 463. 
 250 Id. at 467. 
 251 Id. at 467–68. 
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Thus, Campbell demonstrates that even where the power to establish 
adjudicative facts is allocated exclusively to an independent adjudicator, the 
political leadership may retain power to establish more general legislative facts. 
The independence of the initial decision maker need not eliminate the possibility 
of politicized outcomes; but it does discipline them—mandating a deliberative 
process more likely to result in accurate, or at least better-informed, decisions.  
Even in the context of resolving individual cases, as opposed to broader 
policy decisions, the independence of adjudicators need not displace political 
oversight. This principle is illustrated in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, holding that the Attorney General improperly interfered 
with the BIA’s independence in adjudicating a noncitizen’s removal.252 In that 
case, Accardi’s application for discretionary relief from removal had been 
denied by the trial-level IJ.253 While his appeal was pending before the BIA, the 
Attorney General allegedly circulated a list of “unsavory characters” whom he 
wished to deport.254 The BIA subsequently affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General overstepped his 
authority by violating his own regulations requiring the BIA to exercise 
independent judgment on appeals.255 It held, “as long as the regulations 
[mandating the BIA to exercise independent judgment in each case] remain 
operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep the Board or 
dictate its decision in any manner.”256  
The decision may appear puzzling at first, given that Congress vested 
discretion personally in the Attorney General to grant or deny relief from 
removal.257 Moreover, the Supreme Court acknowledged that regulations 
preserved the Attorney General’s unfettered discretion to reverse any decision 
of the BIA.258 Yet the holding can be understood as promoting a version of 
internal separation of powers.259 The BIA’s exercise of independent judgment 
in the case becomes a part of the formal record; while the Attorney General may 
be free to reverse that decision, any subsequent review of the Attorney General’s 
 
 252 347 U.S. 260, 267–68 (1954). 
 253 Id. at 263. 
 254 Id. at 264. 
 255 Id. at 266–67. 
 256 Id. at 267. 
 257 Id. at 262–63. 
 258 Id. at 266–67. 
 259 Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship, supra note 212 (discussing administrative law’s separation 
of functions between adjudicative functions and other agency functions); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484 (2010) (arguing that much 
of administrative law is informed by but not necessarily mandated by constitutional concerns). 
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final decision—whether by a federal court or the public at large—will consider 
it alongside the opinion and reasoning of the independent adjudicator. Thus, 
while the Attorney General’s final decision may be motivated by political rather 
than legal considerations, such motivations would be uncovered in the act of 
reversal. Allowing the Attorney General to influence the agency adjudicator 
before he or she exercises independent judgment evades such disclosure.260 In 
this way, Accardi’s guarantee of adjudicative independence imposes a check, 
though not an absolute one, on the exercise of raw political power in individual 
cases. 
From the separation-of-powers perspective, then, the legitimacy of political 
influence over agency adjudications depends in part on the extent to which it 
complies with congressional intent, as well as the extent to which it allows space 
for the types of checks and balances contemplated by our constitutional framers.  
As this discussion suggests, the degree of independence that should be 
afforded to agency adjudications is complex and context specific. The proper 
balance between individual interests and majoritarian preferences, and the need 
for checks against unilateral action, will differ across agencies and even across 
types of political interference within a given agency.261 This variance is 
demonstrated in the next section, which evaluates the Trump Administration’s 
reforms to removal proceedings along these metrics.  
B. A Context-Specific Assessment of Politicized Removal Proceedings 
The metrics set forth in the preceding section suggest that overall, 
presidential politics should play only a limited role in removal adjudications. As 
a general matter, even if the current Administration’s immigration court reforms 
could be characterized as electorally responsive, the gravity of the individual 
interests at stake and the need to preserve checks on unilateral power counsel 
against presidential intervention.  
The Trump Administration has been explicit in defending its reforms to 
immigration courts as responsive to a popular mandate. Addressing IJs directly, 
the Attorney General asserted: “The American people have spoken. They have 
spoken in our laws and they have spoken in our elections. They want a safe, 
secure border and a lawful system of immigration that actually works. Let’s 
 
 260 Cf. Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 860 (2015) 
(suggesting that ex ante interference is more tolerable than ex post interference).  
 261 See Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, supra note 17, at 139–40. 
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deliver it for them.”262 In another set of remarks, this time to the Criminal Justice 
Legal Foundation, he stated:  
In the 2016 election, voters said loud and clear that they wanted a 
lawful system of immigration that serves the national interest. They 
said we’ve waited long enough. I believe that this is one of the main 
reasons that President Trump won. He promised to tackle this crisis 
that had been ignored or made worse by so many before him. And now 
he’s doing exactly what the American people asked him to do.263  
To the extent the electoral returns granted President Trump a mandate to rid the 
country of “illegals,” the Administration’s efforts to ensure that all removable 
aliens are in fact removed arguably are politically justified.264  
But even if one agrees that the Administration’s reforms are democratically 
responsive (a point that is highly contested),265 such political accountability must 
be balanced against individual due process interests. Removal proceedings 
epitomize the sort of individualized determinations triggering due process 
protections under Londoner and Bi-Metallic, and the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that noncitizens threatened with deportation are entitled to due 
process protections.266 The threatened deprivation—detention and ultimately 
removal—constitute unusually weighty interests,267 and noncitizens present 
precisely the type of “discrete and insular minorities” whose interests are 
 
 262 Sessions Remarks at Legal Training, supra note 125. 
 263 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Los Angeles, Cal. 
(June 26, 2018). 
 264 This view is consistent with political theories vesting the body politic with the power to define the 
composition of the polity. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, 
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 157–58 (1996) (discussing theory of immigration as part of process of national self-
definition); Michael Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, in BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS 
LIMITS 1–2, 32 (Peter Brown & Henry Shue, eds., 1981); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE 
OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31–32, 34, 62 (1983) (discussing political theory of membership in the polity). 
Since the late-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has characterized decisions relating to the exclusion and 
deportation of noncitizens as fundamentally political, vested exclusively in the Congress and the President as a 
power inherent in sovereignty. Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. 
L. REV. 77, 79, 93 (2017). 
 265 See Sara Kehaulani Goo, What Americans Want to Do About Illegal Immigration, PEW RES. CENTER 
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/08/24/what-americans-want-to-do-about-illegal-
immigration/ (showing that a majority of Americans support granting path to legal citizenship for undocumented 
noncitizens currently residing in the United States if they satisfy certain requirements, and only 17% support 
deporting all noncitizens who are here without documentation). 
 266 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 89, 91 (1903). 
 267 See e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 58 (2011) (“In a foundational deportation case, this Court 
recognized the high stakes for an alien who has long resided in this country, and reversed an agency decision 
that would ‘make his right to remain here dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious.’”) (quoting 
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)). 
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underrepresented in political processes.268 Under these circumstances, the 
independence of agency adjudicators is crucial to moderate the excesses of raw 
majoritarianism.269  
Presidential control over immigration adjudications also arguably 
contravenes congressional intent. As mentioned earlier, the INA vests the power 
to adjudicate removal proceedings personally and exclusively in IJs, not the 
agency’s political leadership.270 Moreover, unlike the APA, the INA does not 
purport to vest political leadership with unfettered review authority.271 These 
provisions suggest that Congress contemplated individual removal decisions be 
made free from political influence.272 
More importantly, presidential control over removal proceedings presents a 
significant threat of unfettered unilateral power in contravention of separation-
of-powers principles. The need for independence in immigration adjudications 
is particularly acute given the virtual absence of external checks and balances.273 
Congress’s ability to discipline removal decisions ex post is extremely limited—
Congress retains power to reverse an order of removal by enacting a private 
immigration bill, but out of the nearly 400 such bills proposed over the past 10 
years, few have been enacted.274 Indeed, it was this legislative inertia that 
prompted Congress to create the one-house legislative veto subsequently 
invalidated in INS v. Chadha.275 Federal courts likewise impose relatively 
limited constraints on Executive Branch removal decisions. Pursuant to the 
“plenary power doctrine,” federal courts have declined to impose rigorous 
constitutional checks on removal decisions.276 Moreover, courts are statutorily 
proscribed from exercising review over an extensive array of removal decisions, 
including challenges to the denial of discretionary relief or to the removal of 
 
 268 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 269 See Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1426, 1448–51 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 29, 52–53, 56, 63 (1985). 
 270 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
 271 See supra notes 81, 83 and accompanying text.  
 272 Concededly, other statutory provisions lend support for the contrary position, that Congress intended 
for removal proceedings to be subject to a degree of political control. The INA provides that IJs are appointed 
by and “shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall 
prescribe.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012). It further vests the power to grant discretionary relief from removal 
personally in the Attorney General, not in IJs. See supra note 84–86 and accompanying text.  
 273 See generally Amanda Frost, Independence and Immigration, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 485, 507 (2016). 
 274 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF PRIVATE IMMIGRATION 
LEGISLATION AND RECENT POLICY CHANGES (2017).  
 275 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983). 
 276 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 711, 731–32 (1893) (sustaining a 
requirement that Chinese aliens produce a white witness to testify to their lawful presence to challenge removal).  
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criminal aliens.277 The limited role of Congress and federal courts in disciplining 
Executive decisions to deport noncitizens makes internal checks on Executive 
power all the more important. These factors suggest that overall, presidential 
politics should play little role in removal proceedings. 
At a more granular level, however, the normative calculus differs across 
different forms of political intervention.278 Perhaps counterintuitively, 
interventions that have the largest aggregate impact on decisional outcomes 
arguably enjoy a stronger claim to legitimacy than some of the other 
interventions. Both the INA279 and administrative law doctrine under Heckler v. 
Campbell280 make clear that the Attorney General retains authority to announce 
broadly applicable policies to which IJs must adhere. Attorney General Sessions’ 
announcement in In re A-B- that asylum generally should not be granted on the 
basis of private criminal violence arguably presents the type of legislative fact-
finding that does not require an independent assessment of historical 
adjudicative facts.281 This is not to say that this decision is legally correct as a 
matter of constitutional or statutory interpretation, or that it is morally 
defensible—in my view, it is not. But it does suggest that allowing the Attorney 
General rather than unelected bureaucrats to make this policy decision more 
closely reflects an appropriate allocation of power between political operatives 
and the bureaucracy.282 Moreover, the blanket nature of the mandate enhances 
 
 277 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2012) (precluding judicial review over denials of discretionary 
relief); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (same for removal orders involving criminal aliens). But see INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 297–98, 302–03, 305 (2001) (construing statutory denial of judicial review over removal decisions 
narrowly in light of constitutional concerns).  
 278 Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 17, at 387 (noting that different forms of political 
influence over adjudication raise different normative concerns).  
 279 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (2012). 
 280 461 U.S. 458 (1983); see supra notes 245–57 and accompanying text.  
 281 See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.  
 282 Importantly, the Attorney General’s actions in both In re A-B- and In re E-F-H-L- raise legitimacy 
concerns separate and apart from any improper interference in agency adjudications. Unlike the policy at issue 
in Heckler v. Campbell, the current Administration’s new asylum policies were announced through the refer-
and-review mechanism rather than through the notice and comment rulemaking procedures of the APA. See 5 
U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring agencies to publish notice of proposed rulemaking in Federal Register and offer 
public opportunity to comment before promulgation of new regulation). The Supreme Court in Campbell 
emphasized the importance of notice-and-comment procedures to ensure the factual accuracy of the challenged 
agency decision. 461 U.S. at 470. The Attorney General’s decisions in In re A-B- and In re E-F-H-L- depart 
significantly from those procedures. In In re A-B-, notice did not appear in the Federal Register, and public 
comments were accepted through amicus briefs only. See In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. 227, 227 (A.G. 2018). In In re 
E-F-H-L-, no prior notice or opportunity to comment was provided at all. See In re E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. 226, 
226 (A.G. 2018). The Attorney General’s use of the refer-and-review mechanism circumvented the careful 
deliberation and thorough explanation that notice-and-comment procedures would have provided, thereby 
compromising the legitimacy of those decisions.  
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uniformity and, given its relative public salience, is more likely to be held to 
public account.283  
At the other end of the spectrum, efforts to pressure individual IJs to reach 
particular outcomes in a given case—such as by threatening negative 
performance reviews, casting aspersions on the credibility of certain types of 
witnesses or certain types of claimants, or the hiring or firing of IJs on the basis 
of ideology—demonstrate the gravest misallocation of authority between 
political leadership and bureaucracy. Few would doubt that such efforts 
compromise the impartiality of adjudicators, thereby violating due process 
norms. Such interventions in individual cases depart furthest from statutory 
directives vesting the power to adjudicate removal proceedings in IJs and raise 
precisely the sorts of concerns addressed in cases like Chadha and Accardi. At 
the same time, they are not likely to improve uniformity and are far less publicly 
salient. 
Between these two extremes lie interventions relating to the procedures used 
in removal proceedings, such as the denial of the power to grant administrative 
closure, limiting the power to grant continuances, or directives to adjudicate 
cases within a particular time frame.284 Arguably such interventions constitute 
precisely the types of managerial controls we would demand of any 
organization. The systematic failure to resolve cases in a timely manner not only 
increases costs to the system but also harms noncitizens, particularly detained 
noncitizens, who seek an efficient system to review their claims to relief from 
removal.285  
But as articulated in the previous section, it is virtually impossible to separate 
these dictates from the Administration’s stated preference for reaching particular 
outcomes—i.e., maximizing the number of deportations as quickly as possible, 
a directive at odds with the independence of hearing-level adjudicators. The 
 
 283 See ASIMOW, supra note 54, at 17–18 (discussing importance of uniformity for perceptions of 
legitimacy); Krent & Morris, supra note 198 (same). 
 284 Others similarly have noted the difficulty in distinguishing between different types of political 
influence over adjudication. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies, supra note 21, at 1299–1300 
(stating that one could not “reasonably quarrel with [the] view that the congestion of the dockets of the agencies 
[and] the delays incident to the disposition of cases . . . are all a part of the President’s constitutional concern to 
see that the laws are faithfully executed . . . . [Yet] I still find difficulty in the proposal that the President should 
not merely see to it that agencies function but should tell them how”); see also Legomsky, War on Independence, 
supra note 17, at 385, 387 (distinguishing “decisional independence” involving interference with individual case 
outcomes from “institutional independence” involving interference with the overall process of adjudication but 
acknowledging they “cannot always be separated neatly”).  
 285 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, slip op. at 5–7 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2018) (involving plaintiffs 
detained over a year pending removal decisions). 
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pressure to speed up case resolution obstructs the noncitizen’s ability to present 
his or her case or obtain counsel, compromises the IJ’s ability to engage in an 
accurate assessment of the facts at issue, and, in the end, risks denying relief to 
unknown numbers of noncitizens notwithstanding their legal eligibility for such 
relief. Importantly, there are numerous alternatives to address the backlog in 
case processing in removal proceedings.286 Indeed, EOIR commissioned a study 
to identify such solutions, which concluded that if performance reviews were to 
be utilized at all, they should emphasize fair process and independence rather 
than quotas and deadlines.287 Rather than limiting the time judges can spend on 
a given case, the agency could continue to hire more judges but ensure that such 
hiring is conducted in a non-partisan manner, improve working conditions for 
these judges, and expand access to counsel, reforms that would address the 
backlog while not tilting decisional outcomes in favor of removal.288 While 
measures to ensure the efficient resolution of cases are permissible, those that 
stack the deck in favor of a preferred case outcome unduly compromise the 
independence and integrity of adjudicative proceedings.   
CONCLUSION 
Administrative law scholars have long documented the emergence of 
presidential control over agencies engaged in Executive and Legislative 
functions, but they have generally assumed that such control does not extend to 
administrative adjudication. The Trump Administration’s recent reforms to 
immigration courts challenge that assumption. Through a series of mechanisms, 
the Administration has eliminated IJs’ ability to administratively close cases, 
limited the availability of asylum, discouraged the release of aliens from 
detention, and imposed significant restrictions on IJs’ ability to carefully 
consider and deliberate on cases. This Article contextualizes these reforms 
within the extant debate over the legitimacy of presidential control over 
agencies, with the ultimate goal of informing future efforts to reconcile tensions 
between norms of political accountability and protections for individual due 
process interests, and between regulatory efficiency and bureaucratic 
independence.  
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